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Preface
This paper was produced as part of the research project on ‘European Pol-
icy for Global Development’ funded by the German Ministry for Econom-
ic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) under the direction of Dr. Sven
Grimm. The project analyses the European Union’s capabilities to engage
for global policy. It looks particularly into the management of policy nexus-
es, i.e. it analyses new European Union (EU) initiatives and instruments
(aid effectiveness), the institutional setup (aid architecture) and the coher-
ence for development. This paper approaches issues of coherence and co-
ordination within the EU’s complex system of multi-level governance – en-
compassing the European as well as the member state level – around two
thematic areas (‘trade’ and ‘security’) and their relation to development pol-
icy – as well as the challenge arising for Europe from emerging new actors
in this field, in particular China.
The study draws on a number of interviews that were conducted at the BMZ
in Bonn and Berlin, the Foreign Ministry in Berlin as well as at numerous
European institutions such as the Council of the EU, the European Com-
mission, the European Parliament and with representatives of various non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) in Brussels.
During all stages of preparing this study, I have benefited a lot from the dis-
cussions with Dr. Sven Grimm, leader of the EU research project, whose
help is gratefully acknowledged. In particular, I would like to thank the
members of the project team Davina Makhan and Christine Hackenesch,
and the other members of Department I, Dr. Guido Ashoff (head), Dr. Erik
Lundsgaarde, Stefan Leiderer, Fatia Elsermann, Silke Weinlich and the
project coordinator Gertrud Frankenreiter.
Stefan Gänzle Bonn, May 2009
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Summary
This study provides an in-depth analysis of the Instrument for Stabili-
ty (IfS), a new European Community (EC) external relations instru-
ment, which came into force on 1 January 2007. Today, the IfS is the
EC’s main policy tool for rapidly funding assistance to countries in sit-
uations of (emerging) crisis and natural disaster. It also constitutes the
Community’s flagship to address what has been called the ‘security-
development nexus’. The IfS provides the Community with additional
financial capacities in crisis management, and it addresses a number of
legal issues, which have complicated operations within the grey area
between traditional foreign and development policies to date.
Subdivided into a short-term and a long-term component, the IfS pur-
sues a threefold operational goal: First, in a situation of emerging po-
litical crisis or natural disaster, it seeks to contribute to stability by pro-
viding an effective response to help preserve, establish or re-establish
the conditions essential in implementing EC development and cooper-
ation policies properly. Thus, the IfS was designed to (1) address new
political crises or natural disasters, (2) respond to a ‘window of oppor-
tunity’ to pre-empt a crisis (e. g. Gaza withdrawal of Israeli forces in
2009), (3) secure the conditions for delivery of EC assistance (e.g. in
Afghanistan) and (4) be part of a joint approach involving European
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operations (e.g. European Union
Force Chad/Central African Republic). Second, in the context of stable
conditions, it aims to improve capacity to address specific global and
trans-regional threats having a destabilising effect, such as for instance
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and human trafficking,
terrorism and organised crime. Third, again in a situation of stable con-
ditions, it seeks, to ensure international and regional organisations, as
well as state and non-state actors’ preparedness to respond to pre- and
post-crisis situations.
The budget allocated for the Instrument for Stability from 2007–2013
amounts to EUR 2,062 million, with the lion’s share of 73 % or EUR
1,505 million being reserved for its short-term component, and 27 % or
EUR 0,557 million being channelled towards the long-term compo-
nent. By its very nature, funding allocated to the short-term component
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is non-programmable thus making the instrument extremely flexible. In
December 2008, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament
decided to channel almost one eighth of the IfS total budget – or € 240
million – towards the so-called Food Facility in order to combat the
global food crisis. Still, the IfS remains an important EC crisis response
tool. Although it has thus far primarily been targeting developing coun-
tries in terms of financial allocations, non-developing EU partner coun-
tries are, in principle, also eligible for IfS assistance.
The Instrument for Stability is more than just a budget line. First, it
seeks to increase the potential for coherence of actors within EC exter-
nal relations (pillar I) by providing a common tool for the response to
disaster and crisis; second, it also proposes to ‘lower the bar’ between
the EU’s complex governance structure with a view to enabling col-
laboration between EC external relations, development policy and the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), i.e. across pillars. Third,
as development policy itself is a shared competence between the Euro-
pean Union and its Member States, it also suggests to improve cooper-
ation between the European and national level.
Towards the backdrop of pending reform of the EU’s system of exter-
nal relations in the context of the Reform Treaty, the IfS has been de-
signed as an opportunity for Commission and Council to gather expe-
rience in closer cooperation in the policy area of the security-develop-
ment nexus. More importantly, the IfS regulation enshrines the obliga-
tion for EU institutions to ensure coherence in the external policies of
both the European Union and the Community. For the first time ever,
an EC external relations’ instrument translates the requirement for EU
external action to be consistent into secondary law – according to Art.
3 (2) of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU).
The emergence of the security-development nexus
and the European Union
The Instrument for Stability has been forged against the background of
on-going international debates on the complex relationship between
development and security. This debate has increasingly been framed in
terms of a ‘nexus’, which means that both are intrinsically linked and
mutually reinforcing. The security-development nexus has two dimen-
The European Community’s Instrument for Stability
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sions: First, a politico-legal one as it suggests that there is need for sus-
tained efforts to further improve coordination and coherence between
distinct, but inter-locking policy areas; second, it exposes a time di-
mension for there is need to marshal instruments that build bridges be-
tween security or humanitarian interventions and long-term develop-
ment programmes.
Clearly, policy links between security and development are not entire-
ly new in this context; however, while both concepts have been con-
verging politically, this interconnectedness is further complicated – if
compared to challenges of whole-of-government or join-up approach-
es at the national level – by the fact that the European Union in terms
of security and development policy subscribes to two, if not three dif-
ferent logics of governance (supranational in the area of trade, inter-
governmental in the realm of CFSP and a mixture of both vis-à-vis de-
velopment policy).
The European Union has developed into a key actor, increasingly shap-
ing the debate and defining the agenda on matters pertaining to the se-
curity-development nexus. Particularly since the ambitious Göteborg
Programme of the then Swedish EU Council Presidency in 2001, the
EU has sought influence in the international as well as national debates
of its Member States. This context was conducive for Member States
to start their national reforms, adjusting their policies in order to better
embrace the challenges of the security-development nexus. The Euro-
pean Union provided a platform for launching discussions on the mak-
ing of a ‘European Civilian Peace Corps’ and a ‘Human Security Doc-
trine for Europe’. The European Commission, in particular, suggested
that the concept of human security should inform the process of link-
ing security and development policies. The term, which is not uncon-
tested, but increasingly used to describe the complexities of interrelat-
ed threats associated with civil war, genocide and the large-scale dis-
placement of populations, advocates a people-centred understanding of
security. Human security challenges traditional state-based concepts of
security. In the context of the EU, advocates of the concept seek to en-
sure that EU security policy take sufficiently into account the human
security needs of people in target countries and regions. Certainly, not
all of these normative projects reaped immediate success; however,
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they prepared the ground for subsequent debates and policy initiatives
at the national level of individual Member States.
Mapping the context of the Instrument for Stability
Throughout the process of European integration, which has placed val-
ues such as peace, security and development high on the agenda, a
complex system of multilevel governance has emerged. This holds par-
ticularly true for the development of the external relations of the EU as
a whole or, in short, ‘EU foreign policy’. From a holistic perspective,
‘European foreign policy’ stretches over the ‘pillar-structure’ of the EU
and includes the national foreign policies of its Member States. Thus it
comprises EC external relations (pillar I – European Community com-
petence) as well as European development cooperation (shared compe-
tence of the Community and the Member States). It has included the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (pillar II) since 1993, which was
later supplemented by a defence component and is driven by the EU’s
Member States. Furthermore, many aspects of the EU’s Police/Judicial
Cooperation in Criminal Matters (pillar III) produce ‘externalities’ such
as EC decision-making in the realm of migration policy.
After the making of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
and in particular with the launch of the European Security and Defence
Policy (ESDP) in the late 1990s, the European Union began to step up
its role in crisis response and conflict prevention. As a consequence,
external policies of the EU’s various pillars (external relations, trade,
development etc.) were drawn much closer together. Since 1999, con-
cern with conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction has in-
creasingly been integrated into development programmes. Program-
ming instruments, such as Country Strategy Papers and Regional Strat-
egy Papers have been elaborated and have integrated aid, trade and po-
litical dimensions. The Commission routinely looks at the root causes
for conflict, which are regularly reported from their country delega-
tions. On the basis of these assessments, external assistance takes into
account conflict prevention measures. Within the EU institutions, in
particular between the Council and the Commission, the Committee for
Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) has been estab-
lished as a platform for reconciling security and development goals.
The European Community’s Instrument for Stability
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The Commission’s Conflict Prevention Unit of DG RELEX has devel-
oped expertise in the fields of security sector reform, mediation, rec-
onciliation, etc.
After a short review of the development of individual strands of EU
foreign policy, it becomes clear that competences in the policy area of
external relations, development and CFSP/ESDP are highly unlikely to
become supra-nationalised any time soon. Clearly, this does not neces-
sarily mean that the process of integration has come to a halt; instead,
there are new strategies that focus on Member States’ willingness to
comply with European integration outside the so-called (functional)
‘Community Method’. Since the inception of the Lisbon Agenda in
2000, many policy areas, such as for instance employment, have been
subjected to exercises of benchmarking and comparing ‘best-practices’
among Member States. This process, which has been labelled ‘Open
Method of Coordination’, relies less on compliance-driven and more
on competitiveness-focussed modes of governance in European inte-
gration.
In principle, this also applies to EU foreign policy, where instances of
supranational integration have been rare, and where an increasing num-
ber of strategies – some including all policy-making European organs
(Council, Parliament and Commission) and the Member States, such as
the European Consensus on Development – have been launched pro-
viding for some common standards and understanding in policy areas.
Although the EU has made efforts to strengthen the links between these
two areas, some problems have remained because of the very nature of
conflicts and the complexity of the EU’s institutional set-up as a secu-
rity actor. There have been initiatives ranging from integrating conflict
prevention analysis to actions for development cooperation pro-
grammes. These have addressed situations of fragility, promoted trans-
parency and equity in the management of natural resources, supported
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes
as well as Security Sector Reform (SSR), or have been for controlling
arms exports, reducing the illicit trafficking of small arms and light
weapons, human beings, narcotics and explosives. In addition, cooper-
ation with other international actors and regional organisations as well
as civil society organisations remains an important task.
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The accelerated evolution of security policy has affected the broader
framework of EU policies for development. Since the 2001 terrorist at-
tacks on the United States, concerns with counter-terrorism and
weapons of mass destruction have had a considerable impact on prior-
ities for EC external assistance. EU aid to Pakistan, which increased af-
ter ‘September 11’ significantly, explicitly referred to the country’s de-
cision to support the international coalition against terrorism. The re-
vised Cotonou Agreement included a clause, which confirms partners’
international cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Although most
spending on these new priorities does not appear to divert funding to
development assistance, these policies clearly prioritise the EU securi-
ty preoccupations of European politicians, at the expense of poverty re-
duction. However, as the key documents have indicated, the ultimate
aim of European external policies is the bridging of the security-devel-
opment nexus.
The Instrument for Stability: The making of a new instrument in EC
external relations
The Instrument for Stability constitutes the EC’s main thematic tool op-
erating in the grey zone of security and development policy. This in-
strument provides for development cooperation measures as well as fi-
nancial, economic and technical cooperation measures with (devel-
oped) partner countries in crisis and conflict situations as well as situ-
ations arising later on.
The Instrument for Stability is built on the Rapid Reaction Mechanism
(RRM), which came into force in 2001. It was an independent instru-
ment equipped with its own budget line and with a broad scope of ap-
plicability mirroring the Commission’s increasing global ‘engage-
ment’. It was launched whenever an action under any of the geograph-
ical or thematic EC instruments was not feasible. Yet, RRM measures
only lasted up to six months and the annual budget for the RRM was
relatively small, on average around EUR 30 million per year, thus put-
ting some financial constraints on each measure.
In the draft regulation for the IfS, the Commission framed peace-keep-
ing and peace-support topics as Community tasks. These ambitious
The European Community’s Instrument for Stability
German Development Institute 7
goals, however, did not meet with the Council’s support; incriminated
concepts such as ‘peace-keeping’ and ‘peace-support’ were subse-
quently eliminated from the text. It appears that the Commission draft
proposal sought a more active role in bringing Community and Union
activities together. The final draft ultimately eliminated references to
peace-keeping and -building, which resulted in criticism from both the
European Commission and the Parliament, acknowledged the Parlia-
ment’s ambition for a Peace-building Partnership. Eventually, the
Council also separated the issues concerning nuclear safety from IfS is-
sues. The European Parliament was given a voice in an area of EC co-
operation policies that would potentially have an impact on security
policy broadly conceived by selecting articles 179 and 181(a) of the
Treaty of the European Community (TEU) as legal basis for the regu-
lation. Thus – instead of Article 308 of the (TEU), which had to be used
for the RRM, the Community approach prevailed. Art. 179 and 181(a)
TEC make the use of the co-decision procedure obligatory, putting the
European Parliament on an equal footing with the Council. Obviously,
this decision was celebrated by the European Parliament as a major
success in increasing its democratic oversight in EC external relations
and the European Parliament’s involvement in matters close to CFSP.
In addition, the Peace-building Partnership Initiative within the IfS pro-
vides NGOs with various financial opportunities as well as some access
to the decision-making process.
Both the Commission and the Council have become very sensitive in
choosing the appropriate legal basis for action. Thus, the IfS may not
necessarily build a bridge between Community action and CFSP oper-
ations, although it certainly has the potential to do so; yet, it helps to
circumscribe the basis of each of the bridge’s pillars, increasing legal
security vis-à-vis the measures to be sponsored by the IfS. Making the
security-development work ultimately remains a political task of all ac-
tors involved, the Commission, the Council, the European Parliament
as well as the Member States.
The Instrument for Stability has clearly increased the speed with which
the Community can now respond to natural disasters and (emerging)
political crises. Besides humanitarian aid, the Community can act with-
in 8 to 12 weeks, and continue to act for up to 18 months. The IfS pro-
vides an important link for long-term (geographical) programmes to
kick in again.
The making of the Instrument for Stability is a step towards strength-
ening the EU’s capacity in civilian crisis intervention. It constitutes an
important addition to EC instruments in response to crisis situations,
the others being humanitarian assistance, civil protection or other ex-
ternal financial instruments when urgently re-deployed in response to a
crisis situation. These Community instruments, together with EU Joint
Actions under CFSP/ESDP, constitute the essence of the EU’s crisis re-
sponse capability.
The Instrument of Stability has the potential to improve coherence for
the European Union’s external action as it determines a number of ar-
eas where Community action prevails for legal reasons; while legally
remaining an EC instrument decided upon by the Commission, the
close coordination with EU Member States, notably in the Political and
Security Committee but also in the geographic working groups, has
made it a politically responsive EC instrument. Yet, it is clear that the
IfS is only a means to translate political will for coherence into con-
crete action; it is not a source for generating similar analysis or politi-
cal will for joint action amongst European institutions and the Member
States themselves.
Conclusion and policy recommendations
1. The EU cannot foster its capacities in linking security and develop-
ment policy unless the Member States are committed to the same ob-
jective domestically. Thus, Member States could use the Instrument
for Stability as a complementary incentive to increase inter-ministe-
rial coordination and seek to align with the overall objectives of the
IfS
2. Despite the European debate on the ‘security-development nexus’,
there still is no blueprint for how to deal best with it from an insti-
tutional angle. There certainly is ample room for improving coordi-
nation of Council and Commission units dealing with the implica-
tions of security-development nexus (and the IfS for that matter)
management. After the pending establishment of the EU External
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Action service, which will be made up of representatives from the
Council, the Commission and Member States diplomatic corps, the
IfS could be used as an entry point for effective Commission and
Council collaboration at the level of EU delegations in third coun-
tries.
3. The Instrument for Stability should be used in close coordination
with CFSP measures, but it should not be used as a complementary
automatically triggered by every and each CFSP action. The IfS
should rather be reserved for those actions that may help to substan-
tiate the security-development nexus.
4. The Instrument for Stability acknowledges the role of NGOs in
processes of peace-building. Although there might be some scepti-
cism about strengthening the role of NGOs, given that it may work
in the opposite direction of enhancing coordination, NGOs need to
be integrated into policy-shaping and policy-taking phases of the In-
strument for Stability more strategically. European NGOs should be
encouraged to strengthen links with other European and, in particu-
lar, southern partners in order to win bids within the Peace-building
Partnership. Furthermore, NGOs in the relevant fields should liaise
with European Commission Delegations.
5. While it is understandable that NGOs might lobby for integrating
peace-building into geographic instruments of cooperation policies,
such as the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and the Eu-
ropean Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), it is ad-
vantageous to maintain a separate funding stream for civil crisis
management at a global scale. As said the IfS is more than yet an-
other budget line; it is the Community’s main instrument for ad-
dressing the security-development nexus in EU foreign policy.
The European Community’s Instrument for Stability
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1 Introduction
Social organisations are often hampered by institutional inertia; further-
more, they attempt to structure external stimuli in a way to make them com-
patible with their own institutional logic. Yet, challenges to security and de-
velopment policy alike, such as state fragility, natural disasters and post-
conflict reconstruction, are unlikely to respect any institutional boundary or
delimitation of competences – in particular not the ones imposed by the Eu-
ropean Union’s complex pillar structure.1 Thus, ultimately, actors in inter-
national relations and global development in general and the EU in partic-
ular are constantly compelled to find new ways in order to increase inter-
institutional as well as intra-institutional collaboration and to provide ef-
fective policy responses. This holds particularly true to the ‘grey area’ or
overlaps that exist between traditional foreign/security and development
policies.
Some policy observers refer to this ‘grey zone’ between foreign and devel-
opment policies in terms of a ‘security-development gap’. By doing so,
they stress the many incompatibilities that loom high on the agenda, in par-
ticular with regards to different perspectives, objectives policy instruments
that are at disposal of both security and development policy. Others frame
the above-mentioned grey area in terms of a ‘nexus’, which means that se-
curity and development are intrinsically linked and mutually reinforcing.
The security-development nexus has two dimensions: First, a politico-legal
one as it suggests that there is need for sustained efforts to further improve
coordination and coherence between distinct, but inter-locking policy areas;
second, it exposes a time dimension for there is need to marshal instruments
that build bridges between security or humanitarian interventions and long-
term development programmes. By all means, current debates on the new
interfaces between security and development have far more strongly em-
phasised “convergence in conceptual and practical policy terms” (see
Klingebiel 2006).
Clearly, the European Union has positioned itself as a proponent of the
‘nexus’ rather than the ‘gap’ approach to foreign and development policies.
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1 In general, I use the term EU to refer to the European Union after the introduction of the
Maastricht Treaty. ‘European Community (EC)’ specifically refers to the first pillar of the
European Union or the time prior to the Treaty of Maastricht.
Being associated to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
ever since the Treaty of Maastricht, the European Commission, for in-
stance, has been constantly pressing for an improved coordination between
External Relations (pillar I) and CFSP (pillar II). Drawing from major pol-
icy documents addressing the nexus issue within the European Union, the
Commission has made an effort to frame the EC Instrument for Stability
(IfS) or, alternatively, the ‘Stability Instrument’ as the Community’s flag-
ship-like instrument whose main purpose is to address the ‘security-devel-
opment nexus’. As the IfS has been designed to equip the EU with a “strate-
gic tool to address a number of global security and development challenges”
(European Commission 2006, 3), expectations are relatively high.
Since January 2007, the IfS has been providing financial assistance to coun-
tries in situations of (emerging) crisis. Consequently, it also is the key in-
strument for substantiating the nexus between security and development
policy. In terms of its policy objectives, the IfS is three-pronged and distin-
guishes between a short-term from a long-term component: First, in situa-
tions of (emerging) crisis (short-term component), it seeks to help to stabil-
ity by providing an effective response to help preserve, establish or re-es-
tablish the conditions essential to the proper implementation of the com-
munity’s development and cooperation policies. Second, it aims, in the con-
text of stable conditions for the implementation of Community cooperation
policies in partner countries (long-term component), to contribute towards
building the capacity to address specific global and trans-regional threats
with a view of countering a destabilising effect, such as proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and trafficking, terrorism and organ-
ised crime. Third, in the same context of stable conditions, it focuses on
supporting international and regional organisations as well as state and non-
state actors’ preparedness to address pre- and post-crisis situations, e.g.
through a Peace-building Partnership (PBP) initiative.
From the perspective of development policy, the Stability Instrument is
highly interesting and relevant for two reasons: First, it needs to be under-
stood towards the backdrop of recent international and EU-internal debates
on the security-development nexus. Second, it perfectly illustrates the com-
plex relationship between EC cooperation policies on the one side and the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as the European Se-
curity and Defence Policy (ESDP) on the other side. This study is explor-
ing this relationship and is structured as follows:
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The evolution of the Stability Instrument cannot be conceptually grasped
without assessing the relationship between security and development that
exists within the European Union (Chapter 2). Clearly, policy links between
security and development are not entirely new in this context; however,
while both concepts have been converging politically, this interconnected-
ness is further complicated – if compared to challenges of whole-of-
government or join-up approaches at the national level – by the fact that the
European Union in terms of security and development policy subscribes to
two, if not three different logics of governance (supranational in the area of
trade, intergovernmental in the realm of CFSP and a mixture of both vis-à-
vis development policy).
Whereas ‘security policy’ has been construed in terms of an intergovern-
mental paradigm and firmly anchored in the field of European Political Co-
operation (EPC) since the early 1970s, development policy, in turn, has
evolved as a shared competence of both the EU institutions and its Member
States and thus patterns of mixed governance involving supranational and
intergovernmental features. In order to better understand this mixed gover-
nance, it is worthwhile to look at the place of security and development pol-
icy within the history of European integration (Chapter 3).
It is the aim of this analysis to examine the Instrument for Stability and to
assess whether it provides for more clarity in terms of the security-devel-
opment nexus (Chapter 4). Although the discourse on the security-develop-
ment nexus has not been directly translated into policy-making, this study
shows that specific actors have used it as a leverage to strengthen their
role(s) in EU external relations. Finally, the study concludes with a number
of policy recommendations (Chapter 5).
This study provides the first monographic analysis of the EC Instrument for
Stability. It is obvious that the recent implementation of this new tool in EC
external relations combined with the lack of any impact and effectiveness
assessment ‘on the ground’, impose some constraints in terms of the scope
of the analysis. This study seeks to understand the linkage between the pol-
icy-making in development as well as its discourse at the level of the EU
and its transformation into new instruments. It is a desk study revising the
current state of the academic as much as EU-centred debate on the securi-
ty-development nexus. As a consequence, this study is based on a number
of expert interviews and telephone interviews with Commission staff,
members of the European Parliament as well as officials from the Member
The European Community’s Instrument for Stability
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States. These interviews were conducted from August 2008 to March 2009
in Bonn, Berlin and Brussels.
2 The emergence of the security-development nexus
and the European Union (EU)
2.1 From gap to nexus: security and development
Security has become ubiquitous in the ‘post-9/11’ world. Security concerns,
and consequently security policies, have become paramount and started to
intrude into the everyday life of many people all over the world. Govern-
ments have substantially reinforced security sectors and increased security-
awareness in many domains of governance, including migration, media and
welfare systems. New international agreements as well as public-private
partnerships focussing on security were negotiated.
Both concepts – security and development – have undergone significant
change after the end of the Cold War and in the aftermath of the terrorist at-
tacks of 11 September 2001. Security issues have crept into areas of devel-
opment so smoothly that some analysts and practitioners fear that develop-
ment policy has been ‘securitised’ and radicalised (see Buur / Jensen / Step-
putat 2007, 10). Some experts argue that the merging of development and
security programmes entails the risk of promoting a more military-based
approach to development programmes, thus reinforcing the prospect that
traditional military assistance be included in development budgets.
Although the relationship between development and security is “not a fun-
damentally new conceptual link” (Klingebiel 2006, 1), the end of the Cold
War theatre has triggered new thinking about the relationship and comple-
mentarity of both concepts. Today, the inter-connectedness between devel-
opment and security is no longer discussed in the abstract, but rather as a
hands-on convergence in conceptual and policy-making terms. Yet, securi-
ty policy and development policy still provide different perspectives: whilst
security is an important goal in development policy, it is (if following a de-
velopment rationale) not an end-goal in itself – as it is the case in security
policy proper. Furthermore, development policy is, in principle, about the
development of the addressees or policy objects – security policy, in turn,
is first and foremost about the security of the policy subjects.
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Towards this background, it seems appropriate to assume that a security-
development gap exists prima facie. Yet, at the same time, both are in-
creasingly perceived as forming a ‘nexus’ such that they are generically
linked and intertwined. However, a ‘nexus’ is not necessarily factual in it-
self, but rather a construction of two or more social phenomena, which are
put into a logical relationship of mutually reinforcing interdependence. As
such, the idea of nexus has been proliferating, as in a migration-develop-
ment or environment-development nexus etc. The security-development
nexus is a particularly important one.
The changing concepts reflect the transformation of the global political
landscape after the end of the Cold War. By and large, scholars today agree
that interstate wars are declining, but that internal conflicts have been in-
creasing since the 1980s. However, the frequency, duration, and intensity of
each conflict vary significantly. Thus, the ‘Peace and Conflict Report’ of
2005 conducted by researchers at the University of Maryland argues that
there has been a “decline in the global magnitude of armed conflict,” but al-
so that “half [of] the world’s countries have serious weaknesses that call for
international scrutiny and engagement” (Marshall / Gurr 2005, 1 f.). The
Human Security Report, issued in 2005, calculated that there has been a de-
cline in the number of wars, genocides, and human rights abuses over the
past decade due to international peace-keeping efforts since the Cold War –
citing United Nation (UN) presence, broadly defined as well as other diplo-
matic initiatives, economic sanctions, peacekeeping missions, and civil so-
ciety activism.
Ultimately, as succinctly shown by Paul Collier, the important point is that
weak and failing states represent a new class of conflict, and cannot be sub-
sumed under the rubric of ‘isolated events’ (Collier 2007, 68 ff.). People of
the ‘bottom billion’ live in countries, which are conflict-prone and run a
significant risk of collapsing. These insecure, unstable and failing states
have the potential to provide a breeding ground for terrorism, organised
crime, weapons proliferation, humanitarian emergencies, ecological degra-
dation, and political extremism – security concerns that will affect every-
one. Since the end of the Cold War, various international organisations have
sought to respond to these changes of environment and to adjust in terms of
their policies.
Before that, the main activity of many international actors, in particular the
United Nations, was that of ‘peace-keeping’, “which typically involved the
deployment of lightly armed military force to monitor a cease-fire patrol or
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a neutral buffer zone between former combatants” (Paris 2004, 13). As it
would have threatened the delicate global balance of power, peace enforce-
ment was simply out-of-bounds. Ever since the end of the Cold War, the
aim of the international community was to more comprehensively encom-
pass a greater number, if not all, phases of conflict. Thus, the attention of
international actors and organisations shifted from just peace-keeping to in-
clude peace-building (see Grävingholt / Gänzle / Ziaja 2009). From the per-
spective of peace-building, policies of development and security are con-
ceived in terms of being mutually reinforcing. Consequently, both policy-
makers in the domain of development as well as security/military person-
nel have come a long way in accepting that closer coordination and possi-
bly even cooperation may yield mutual success. Coping with fragile states
and addressing the issue of peace- or state-building requires thorough
thinking about long-term development well beyond a narrowly confined
horizon of military engagement; concomitantly, processes of development
need to be bolstered by measures providing for the security not only of per-
tinent actors, but also for addressees of development policy.
International organisations, such as the United Nations, the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the EU, have
contributed to the debate on adjusting international as well as national poli-
cies to better integrate development and security themes at various levels.
The UN, for instance, established a new political forum, the Peace-building
Commission in 2005, in order to better monitor and support countries
emerging from conflicts (see Weinlich / Schneckener 2005). The key issues
of this debate are: the integration of civilian and military capacities; the co-
ordination, complementarity and coherence of development and security
policies; the security-development nexus in terms of legal, institutional and
political considerations in general (Tannous 2007, 5) and the security-de-
velopment nexus at various levels of a policy-making cycle, i.e. at the lev-
el of inter-ministerial cooperation or the collaboration of implementing
agencies (input versus output orientation) (see Box 1).2
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2 Ultimately, Klingebiel identifies three major challenges to the development-security
nexus: First the issue of ‘integrated missions’ in which there are a growing number of sit-
uations where development policy interfaces with military actors; second, the need for
military and development actors to identify areas for coordination (e.g. security sector re-
form); third, the issue of political and financial responsibility needs to be addressed
(Klingebiel 2006).
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3 I am grateful to Guido Ashoff for drawing my attention to this.
Box 1: Different actors, different ways of dealing with the
security-development nexus
With regard to the security-development nexus at various levels of the policy-
making cycle, the United States and its new military Command for Africa
(AFRICOM) seeks to address the security-development nexus at the level of
policy implementation without recourse to stronger inter-ministerial coordina-
tion involving the U.S. Department of Defence, the U.S. Department of State,
and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) (see Gänzle 2009).
Other governments, such as the German Federal Government, have focused on
improving inter-ministerial coordination (ressortübergreifende Kooperation).
The inter-ministerial Action Plan “Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolu-
tion and Post-Conflict Peace-Building”, adopted on 12 May 2004 by the cabinet,
anchors crisis prevention as a cross-sectoral political task at both government
and society levels. To achieve these goals, the government has set up a steering
committee (Ressortkreis) in September 2004 under the leadership of the Foreign
Ministry, which includes representatives from different ministries (German Fed-
eral Government 2004). In order to ensure the participation of actors from civil
society, the government has also established an adjunct Council “Civilian Crisis
Prevention” (see Klotzle 2007, 433).
The United Kingdom (UK) has been subscribing to inter-ministerial pooling –
such as for instance joint targets of the Department for International Develop-
ment (DFID), Defence and Foreign Office, including joint budget lines)3 – since
April 2001. It has established Conflict Prevention Pools (CPPs) designed to en-
hance the effectiveness of the UK’s contribution to conflict prevention and man-
agement. Furthermore, the UK created a Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit
within the Department for International Development including experts from the
Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
The Netherlands, to give yet another example, established a ‘Stability Fund’ in
2004 providing immediate and flexible support for activities at the interface be-
tween peace, security and development. This Stability Fund disposes of re-
sources from both the development budget (Official Development Assistance –
ODA) and the general foreign policy budget (non-ODA) and was created in re-
sponse to the need for a more integrated instrument, absorbing smaller funds
such as those for small arms control, de-mining and peace-building. In a nut-
shell, all these national and international efforts, labelled as ‘whole-of-
government’ or joint-up government approaches, have sought to increase and ul-
timately improve coordination across several portfolios and (legal) competences
either at the input or output level of complex policy-making.
Towards this background, the European Union has developed into a key ac-
tor, increasingly shaping the debate and defining its agenda. Particularly
since the ambitious Göteborg Programme of the then Swedish EU Council
Presidency in 2001, the EU has sought influence in the international as well
as national debates of its Member States. It is in this conducive context that
the Member States have started their national reforms, adjusting their poli-
cies in order to better embrace the challenges of the security-development
nexus. The European Union provided a platform for launching discussions
on the making of a ‘European Civilian Peace Corps’ and a ‘Human Securi-
ty Doctrine for Europe’ – certainly, not all of these normative projects
reaped immediate success; however, they prepared the ground for subse-
quent debates and policy initiatives at the national level of individual Mem-
ber States (see Tannous 2007, 6).
2.2 Human development, human security and
a human security doctrine
Perhaps more than the concept of development, our understanding of secu-
rity has changed after 1989. Whereas ‘security’ was primarily associated
with the idea of a ‘security of surviving’, implying a rather defensive no-
tion before the annus mirabilis, the post Cold War idea shifted to a ‘securi-
ty of thriving’ focussing on a societal dimension and emphasising the need
for fostering political and economic stability in order to engineer overall se-
curity. Thus, the term subsequently opened up to encompass a protective se-
curity understanding. Rethinking security in the post-Cold War world was
heralded, among others, by Barry Buzan and then by the Copenhagen
school of ‘critical security studies’ under the leadership of Ole Wæver
(Buzan / Wæever / Wilde 1998). Yet, these protagonists of a revised ana-
lytical concept of security did not necessarily advocate an entirely new per-
spective. Rather, they argued that in addition to external and internal secu-
rity, focussing on the state itself as well as its position in the system of in-
ternational relations, security should depart from a sectoral and thematic
approach.
Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver und Jaap de Wilde (1998) differentiate several di-
mensions of security focussing on military, environmental, economic, soci-
etal and political security. Some analysts have further suggested subsuming
the non-military security risks as issues of ‘soft security’ whereas military
security matters should be describes as being ‘hard security’ in nature.
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Clearly, this analytical approach has met with harsh criticism (see Knudsen
1998, 47 f.). Furthermore, a traditional perspective of security assumes that
the state is the exclusive guarantor of this essential public good, differenti-
ating between military defence, safeguarding domestic order and protection
against societal threats such as terrorism. Since the end of the Cold War, it
can be observed that the later threat scenario – which is societal – has in-
creased, whereas state-originating and state-focused security threats have
decreased. This trend is by no means irrevocable, and does not necessarily
mean that ‘soft security’ threats may replace ‘hard security’ cases.
Similar to the conceptualisations of security, the mere existence of the Cold
War had a significant impact on the way policy-makers and analysts alike
thought about ‘development’. Essentially, the challenge of international de-
velopment evolved in the immediate aftermath of World War II, at a time
when the Cold War emerged and decolonisation began. Lancaster (2008,
36 f.) differentiates between several periods, each of which can be associ-
ated with a different set of development objectives. However, as a point of
departure, development assistance was always dependent on the willing-
ness of wealthy (Northern) countries – for a wide range of motives – to pro-
vide concession-based economic assistance to (Southern) countries. Devel-
opment assistance was granted either directly to recipient governments
and/or donor agencies or channelled through international organisations.
Over this period, the thrust of development assistance underwent several
changes: During the 1960s, funds were allocated for measures that would
improve infrastructure and projects that would expand national production
in order to foster economic growth. The 1970s witnessed direct action to al-
leviate poverty. Later, support for economic reforms and structural adjust-
ments were to become the dominating paradigm of the 1980s. Finally, with
the collapse of many communist regimes, support for the transition to
democracy and market reforms became paramount.
Although the core focus of development always remained poverty reduc-
tion, contemporary international development has turned into a relatively
“elastic idea” (Lancaster 2008, 37). The concept of human development has
become part of it, meaning that education, health, life expectancy and oth-
er indicators are given greater attention. Human development itself, ac-
cording to the EU and echoing what had been spelt out by the United Na-
tions Development Programme (UNDP) before, forms the core of the de-
velopment process and is the ultimate objective of development policy
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(Council of Ministers 2005). This is a broad-based concept that not only
covers conventional social development in areas such as health and educa-
tion, but also gender equality, children and youth, employment and cultur-
al diversity. This broad understanding is already reflected in the definition
of the Millennium Development Goals adopted by the UN Summit in 2000,
although the United Nations does not provide a clear-cut definition of ‘hu-
man development’ itself (see United Nations 2000). Due to this broader no-
tion of human development, ‘human security’ – as we will see – “represents
the fusion of development and security” (Duffield 2006, 14). At the same
time, however, there is the fear that development is going to be watered
down by security concerns:
“While human security represents the fusion of development and security,
the critics argue that thebalance has tipped against development and in
favour of a “harder” version of security which prioritises homeland liveli-
hood systems and infrastructures. This incarnation of security threatens to
absorb development with, among other things, pressures to reprioritise de-
velopment criteria in relation to supporting intervention, reconstructing
crisis states and, in order to stem terrorist recruitment, protecting liveli-
hoods and promoting opportunity within strategically important areas of
instability. For its critics, the war on terrorism has reversed the progress
made during the 1990s in promoting a universalistic human rights agen-
da and refocusing aid on poverty reduction” (Duffield 2006, 14).
Thus, human security remains a relatively new political concept, which is
not uncontested, but increasingly used to describe the complexities of in-
terrelated threats associated with civil war, genocide, and the large-scale
displacement of populations. Separating the analytical capacity of human
security from a political programme is not always simple and straightfor-
ward. It is not surprising then that more than a decade after its inception,
human security still remains a highly contested concept with regard to “its
definition, its scope and its utility” (Oberleitner 2005, 186).
Proponents of a human security agenda hail ‘human security’ as a concept
providing much-needed insights into the changing nature of post-Cold War
security. In a nutshell, they argue for concern over individuals and so-
cial/human groups as core objects of security and they emphasise the need
to involve non-state actors as core subjects (therefore the strong emphasis
on a ‘democratisation of foreign policy’). Furthermore, they claim that the
concept traces its intellectual origins back over one hundred years when
Henri Dunant founded the Red Cross as a forerunner of the human securi-
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ty approach. At the same time the concept has met with strong resistance.
Critics and opponents have pointed out conceptual flaws in ‘human securi-
ty’, arguing that it may give inappropriate hopes and desires that cannot be
met in reality as it is unlikely that powerful states will voluntarily constrain
their foreign policy options (in the way of principled humanitarian inter-
ventionism). Some fears have also been expressed that human security may
develop into some sort of ideological doctrine (see Oberleitner 2005, 187
for an overview).
The UNDP Report of 1994, masterminded by the late development econo-
mist Mahub ul-Haq, for the first time provided a vague definition of ‘hu-
man security’ as: a universal concern; possessing interdependent compo-
nents; easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention; and
people-centred, moving from territorial to people’s security, and from se-
curity through armaments to security through sustainable human develop-
ment (see ul-Haq 1998).
Yet, today – despite the work of various international commissions such as
the Commission on Human Security, set up in 2001 – there is still no wide-
ly accepted definition of human security. Proponents of human security
agree that the distinction between human security and a more traditional
concept of national security is an important one: While national security fo-
cuses on the defence of the state from external attack, human security is
about protecting individuals and communities from any form of political vi-
olence. In this sense, human security very much falls in line with Barry
Buzan’s considerations on state security (see above).
Furthermore, human security and national security should be conceived as
mutually reinforcing. Protecting citizens from foreign attacks may be a nec-
essary condition for the security of individuals, but it is not a sufficient one.
Indeed, during the last one hundred years far more people have been vic-
tims of their own governments than of foreign armies. All proponents agree
that the primary goal of human security is the protection of individuals;
however, there is disagreement on which kind of threats individuals should
be protected from. Proponents of the ‘narrow’ concept of human security,
which underpins the Human Security Report, focus on violent threats to in-
dividuals, while recognising that these threats are strongly associated with
poverty, lack of state capacity and various forms of socio-economic and po-
litical inequity. Whereas the ‘broad’ concept of human security, as articu-
lated in the UN Development Programme’s 1994 ‘Human Development
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Report’, and the Commission on Human Security’s 2003 report, ‘Human
Security Now’, advocates the threat agenda should be broadened to include
hunger, disease and natural disasters because these kill far more people than
war, genocide and terrorism combined. In response to this debate, Gerd
Oberleitner (2005, 187 f.) proposes three conceptual categories:
“[A] narrow approach that relies on natural rights and the rule of law an-
chored in basic human rights; a humanitarian approach that understands
human security as a tool for deepening and strengthening efforts to tack-
le issues such as war crimes or genocide and finally preparing the ground
for humanitarian intervention; and a broad approach that links human se-
curity with the state of the global economy, development, and globaliza-
tion.”
In the context of the international debate on ‘human security’ since the end
of the Cold War, the individual-protection approach (i.e. not exclusively
vis-à-vis the state) has provided an entry point for ‘development’ concerns.
Security issues have appeared on the development policy radar and securi-
ty policy has been integrated into a broader range of concerns for develop-
ing and transition countries, so that there are an increasing number of situ-
ations where development and security meet in practice. First, there are ‘in-
tegrated’ or ‘civilian-military missions’ where actors with a development or
military background are constrained by collaboration. These forms of in-
teractions are common currency in the so-called Provincial Reconstruction
Teams in Afghanistan and in many efforts targeting security sector reforms
(SSR). Second, there is a concrete need to identify the scope and modalities
for cooperation. Third, development and security policy needs to address
the issue of responsibility and financing. The official definition of what
constitutes official development assistance (ODA) attempts to take into ac-
count – in some respects – the new range of tasks to be performed by de-
velopment policy. In March 2005, the High-level Meeting of Ministers and
Heads of Aid Agencies for the OECD’s Development Assistance Commit-
tees (DAC) decided to adapt the then applied ODA criteria. For example,
the management of security expenditure through improved civilian over-
sight and democratic control of budgeting, management, accountability and
auditing of security expenditure is now eligible for ODA (see Klingebiel
2006, 4).
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3 Mapping the context of the Instrument
for Stability
3.1 EU links between security and development
It would be utterly wrong to dismiss the history of European integration as
a mere exercise of regional economic integration. Ever since its ‘break-
through’ at the end of World War II, European integration has enshrined the
idea of peace-building in Europe based on economic as well as political ob-
jectives and means. Both the economic and political leitmotifs have been
translated into either a pragmatic functionalist (involving the so-called
Community Method) or a rather idealistic federal approach to European in-
tegration. However, after the experiences of reoccurring European inter-
state wars and two world wars over the past two centuries, both designs for
European integration have ultimately been concerned with the making of a
sustainable and ‘working’ peace system (Mitrany 1966).
While the goal of ‘making peace in Europe’ has been primarily limited to
the western part of Europe, it only gradually expanded to embrace South-
ern, Northern and, eventually, Eastern European countries in the 1980s. As
such, the process of European integration has shown that inter-state rela-
tions could be – in the words of François Duchêne – ‘domesticated’ and
thus liberated from the nightmare of warfare (Duchêne 1973). Duchêne
himself saw the European Union as an important potential promoter to such
‘domestication’ of international relations – well beyond the geographical
confines of Europe (see Box 2). As a ‘civilian power’4 it could also provide
powerful impulses towards international cooperation and global integra-
tion.
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Box 2: The external dimension of European integration
From its inception in the post-World War II years, the process of European inte-
gration has also provided the script for designing ‘special relations’ with other
non-European countries – in particular those from Africa. In the Schuman Dec-
laration of 9 May 1950, the French foreign minister proposed that the “Franco-
German production of coal and steel […] will be offered to the world as a whole
Since its foundation, the EC has changed continuously and the process of
European integration has, on the whole, ‘deepened’ and become more
‘communitarised’ – i.e. community-oriented – in some areas (such as for in-
stance the single market, trade policy, etc.) and less so in others (foreign
policy, taxation, etc.). Far from being a linear process, the EC/EU has ulti-
mately acquired new competences in areas such as environment and con-
sumer protection, to name but a few. However, other policy areas, in par-
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without distinction or exception, with the aim of contributing to raising living
standards and to promoting peaceful achievements. With increased resources
Europe will be able to pursue the achievement of one of its essential tasks, name-
ly, the development of the African continent” (Schuman 1950). Thus, the out-
ward-looking or external dimension of European integration cannot be underes-
timated, in particular at a time when half of the founding members of the Euro-
pean Communities were still engaged in colonial activities.
In the late 1950s, France, Belgium and the Netherlands were still colonial pow-
ers although most them were constrained to respond to the desire of their
colonies to become independent and thus facing the spectre of decolonisation.
Belgium and France, for instance, were particularly keen to ensure that the Eu-
ropean Communities would assume ‘their’ share, which is a common responsi-
bility for EC members’ colonial possessions. Besides the question of access to
European markets for the (then) colonies, the pooling of resources in develop-
ment assistance – albeit outside the EC budget in the European development
fund (EDF) – served as some sort of starting point. Clearly, this presented a com-
promise between the Member States, as for a wide range of reasons, the issue of
a shared responsibility (between the Community and the Member States) and the
need for EC development assistance was highly questioned by countries such as
West Germany (see Engel 2000).
Thus the European project started out as an Economic Community whose main
concern was to ensure peace in Europe by economic means. Despite the fact that
the Community was engaged in development policy from the outset, the main
perspective remained rather inward looking, primarily focusing on the making
of truly common market which formally had been achieved from 1986 to 1993.
Implementing a single market, however, yields significant effects on those coun-
tries, which are excluded, regional integration, almost per definition, creates ‘ex-
ternalities’ effects with which outsiders have to cope, economically and politi-
cally. Contrary to the Community’s commercial policy and other cooperation
policies, development policy constitutes a ‘shared competence’ of both Member
States (which maintain national development policies) and the European Com-
munity.
ticular foreign policy, have remained relatively immune vis-à-vis the ‘Com-
munity Method’5 – by and large based on supranational institution-building
and decision-making – taking an intergovernmental shape instead.
Although the initiative for a European Defence Community (EDC) – a core
post-war political project – was vetoed by the French parliament in 1954,
there have been subsequent efforts to complement economic integration by
a political integration. For example, the French President Charles De
Gaulle and his foreign minister Christian Fouchet advocated stronger inter-
governmental links in foreign affairs in order to secure French dominance
in Europe and to counter US’ influence on Europe amongst members of the
EC. Indeed, the Member States agreed to increase coordination and con-
sultation within the EC and launched the European Political Cooperation
(EPC) in the 1970s. The heads of state and government, however, agreed
that EPC should remain outside the Community structure – and was thus
not subject to the Community Method and its institutions.
Therefore, European Political Cooperation started out as an intergovern-
mental exercise, but trade-related aspects of foreign policy allowed the Eu-
ropean Commission to maintain a role foreign policy. The EPC, for in-
stance, yielded some successes during the ‘Helsinki process’ of the 1970s,
which was in itself perceived as a ‘test ground’ for European Political Co-
operation (see Cameron 1995). In the negotiation process covering the eco-
nomic and cooperation aspects of East-West cooperation, for instance, the
European Commission managed to develop into a key interlocutor. Thus,
coordination between the Community institutions as well as Member States
and the EC institutions became more important in order to ensure consis-
tency of the Community’s external relations. Similarly, in the context of the
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5 The ‘Community Method’ is the expression used for the institutional operating mode for
the first pillar of the European Union. It builds on integration logic exhibiting the fol-
lowing salient features: 1) Commission ‘monopoly’ of the right of initiative; 2) general
use of qualified majority voting in the Council; 3) an active role for the European Par-
liament (co-decision procedure); 4) uniformity in the interpretation of Community law
ensured by the European Court of Justice. In contrast, the method used for the second and
third pillars is similar to the so-called ‘Intergovernmental Method’, with the difference
that the Commission shares its right of initiative with the Member States, the European
Parliament is informed and consulted and the Council may adopt binding acts. As a gen-
eral rule, the Council acts unanimously (European Convention 2005).
EC-South Africa relations since the 1980s, questions emerged in regards to
whether political decisions taken in the EPC framework may or may not
trigger specific responses on behalf of the Community. The more the Euro-
pean Community developed into an economic power due to the scope of
economic integrations since the late 1960s, the more necessities arose to put
EPC and EC external relations ‘into sync’ and into the same gear.
Finally, when the Maastricht Treaty entered into force in 1993, the newly
forged European Union ‘equipped’ itself with a Common Foreign and Se-
curity Policy (CFSP); in 1999, eventually a defence component in the shape
of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was added. As inter-
governmental cooperation substantially increased in the area of foreign, se-
curity and defence policy over the past few years, the Community was ex-
plicitly asked to marshal policies that are in a position to parallel and com-
plement these initiatives, a requirement that is particularly needed in areas
of shared competence such as for instance development cooperation as well
as cross-cutting policy issues such as security and development. Thus, in
contrast to CFSP/ESDP-based foreign policy or EC cooperation policies,
development subscribes to yet another logic of integration – one that re-
quires coordinative efforts from the outset.
3.2 The system of ‘European foreign policy’ and
European development policy
‘European foreign policy’ is a highly complex sub-set of the European
Union’s multilevel governance system; from a holistic perspective, it
stretches over the ‘pillar-structure’ of the EU and includes the national for-
eign policies of its Member States. Thus it comprises EC external relations
(pillar I – Community competence) as well as European development co-
operation (shared competence of the Community and the Member States).
Since 1993, it has included the Common Foreign and Security Policy (pil-
lar II), which was later supplemented by a defence component. Further-
more, many aspects of the EU’s Police/Judicial Cooperation in Criminal
Matters (pillar III) produce ‘externalities’ such as EC decision-making in
the realm of migration policy (see Figure 1).
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Until 1992, the EC’s system of external relations basically relied on EC ex-
ternal foreign economic policy (i.e. trade and commercial policy) as well as
development cooperation, complemented by the intergovernmental Euro-
pean Political Cooperation (EPC). In this vein, Paul Taylor argued, from a
conceptual perspective that European foreign policy was essentially decen-
tralised, consisting of three strands – national foreign policy, the European
Political Cooperation and the external relations of the EC (Taylor 1982,
15); this in principle can still be applied today. Thus European foreign pol-
icy should be understood as a highly dynamic sub-set of the EU’s system
of multi-level governance. Yet, these strands do not co-exist independently;
rather, they influence one another formally and informally. As the CFSP-
relevant provisions of the Maastricht Treaty stipulate, Member States’ for-
eign policies are compelled to conform with EU foreign policy and EC ex-
Figure 1: The pillar structure of the European Union (EU)
Source: Phinnemore (2007, 37)
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ternal relations. As various studies suggest,6 the ‘national’ foreign policies
of EU Member States converge towards agreements elucidated at the Eu-
ropean level or, alternatively, that the European dimension penetrates into
the national arena.
After the end of the Cold War, European foreign policy received a tremen-
dous boost. The intergovernmental European Political Cooperation,
launched in 1970s, developed into a Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) and became pillar II of the European Union with the entry into
force of the Treaty of Maastricht (1993). Following the St. Malo summit of
the UK and France in 1998, the CFSP was ‘supplemented’ by a European
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) forging new institutions and fostering
increased efforts of military cooperation between EU Member States. The
launch of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) at the Euro-
pean Council meeting in Cologne in June of 1999 took the 1998 Franco-
British St. Malo agreement up to an EU-wide level and provided yet an-
other important impetus: It left some Member States of the EU – particu-
larly those with a history of non-alignment and ‘neutrality’, such as Austria,
Finland, Sweden and Ireland (see de Flers 2007; Ojanen 2008) – with the
desire to see the EU’s capacities further strengthened to provide a civilian
approach to crisis and conflict prevention.
First, it was deemed necessary to build a visible civilian component within
the ESDP itself in order to balance its military aspirations. Second, the EU
Member States also agreed to improve the Commission’s toolbox in crisis
and conflict prevention and to increase general coherence between cooper-
ation policies and the CFSP, with a particular view to the Commission and
Council. Third, the Commission was willing to subscribe to the idea of an
“integrated framework for both security and development” (European
Commission 2004, 2), a principle already enshrined in the Cotonou Part-
nership Agreement stating “that a political environment guaranteeing
peace, security and stability, respect for human rights, democratic princi-
ples and the rule of law, and good governance is part and parcel of long
Stefan Gänzle
28 German Development Institute
6 Tonra (2001) has analysed the Europeanisation of Dutch, Danish and Irish foreign poli-
cies, that of British foreign policy vis-à-vis Zimbabwe, Wong (2006) that of French pol-
icy in Asia, and Miskimmon (2008) that of Germany. Although it is difficult to gener-
alise, these authors conclude that EU foreign policy has had a positive effect on Member
States, as they are converging towards EU foreign policy standards and objectives.
term development” (APC-EU 2000, 4). Bridging the gap between security
and development in an EU context, however, not only requires an im-
provement of institutional coordination and cooperation, but also entails a
legal dimension because security and development are part of different le-
gal jurisdictions. Whereas CFSP remains in the sole competence of the EU
Member States, development policy is a shared competence of both the Eu-
ropean Community and its Member States.
It was towards this background that the European Union began to step up
its role in crisis response and conflict prevention since the late 1990s. The
Helsinki European Council in December 1999 called for the establishment
of a “non-military crisis management mechanism […] to coordinate and
make more effective the various civilian means and resources, in parallel
with the military ones” (European Council 1999). Thus, even before the
launch of the Stability Instrument in 2007, EC external instruments con-
tributed to the EU’s overall crisis response, be it a natural disaster or a po-
litical crisis in a third country, and in the latter case it often included EU
Joint Actions under CFSP or ESDP. Between 2000 and 2006 it was notable
that this role was played by the EC Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM),
with a view to non-humanitarian crisis responses. Despite modest financing
(in the order of EUR 30 million per year) and a straight-jacket in terms of
programme duration (maximum six months), RRM-funded projects as-
sumed an important role in a number of EU crisis responses, “in many cas-
es kick-starting programmes under geographic instruments or dovetailing
with CFSP/ESDP actions” (European Commission 2008d, 2).
The Treaty of Nice, effective on 1 February 2003, contained new CFSP pro-
visions, increasing the areas decided by qualified majority voting and en-
hancing the role of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), particular-
ly for crisis management. The PSC, which consists of representatives of the
Member States at ambassador level and the Commission, prepares recom-
mendations on the future functioning of the CFSP, including European Se-
curity and Defence Policy (ESDP) and deals with the day-to-day handling
of these issues. The PSC is also authorised to take decisions under delegat-
ed authority from the Council during periods of crisis management, includ-
ing both civilian and military aspects. Furthermore, three new bodies were
set up in the Council: a committee for civilian aspects of crisis manage-
ment, a military committee and a political military group. In addition, a
body of military experts chosen by the Member States was set up under the
direction of the military committee.
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With the completion of the Single Market in the early 1990s, the European
Union also established itself as an increasingly important actor in interna-
tional trade. Throughout the institutionalisation of the World Trade Organ-
ization (WTO) in 1995 and the subsequent trade talks (e.g. Doha Round),
the European Commission managed to strengthen its role as the EU’s sin-
gle voice in matters of international trade (a role which it still aspires to in
the realm of CFSP, where it remains only ‘associated’). Finally, European
development cooperation has been subject to various reforms focusing,
among other things, on legal and institutional aspects of aid assistance with-
in the Community. In a nutshell, since the end of the 1990s, improving ex-
ternal relations and the management of development aid have become key
components of the current reform of the European Community (EC).
In the light of the 2004 enlargement, the convention process of adopting a
Constitutional Treaty was aimed at consolidation of the EU’s internal or-
ganisation and creation of a single constitutional space replacing the pletho-
ra of treaties that currently make up the European Union. In a nutshell, the
Treaty suggested attributing a legal personality not only to the European
Community, but also to the whole European Union – thus renouncing to the
Maastricht Treaty’s pillar structure of the EU, which only granted the first
pillar with legal personality. The Constitutional Treaty, however, failed in
the aftermath of the French and Dutch referenda in June 2005. After the
subsequent ‘reflection period’ prescribed by the European Commission
President Barroso, the German EU Council Presidency managed to revi-
talise the ‘constitutional process’ in the course of 2007, and to eventually
prepare for the adoption of a Reform Treaty solemnly signed by the Mem-
ber States under the Portuguese EU Council Presidency in December of
that year. After the treaty was put on hold following the negative Irish ref-
erendum in June 2008, it is expected that it will enter into force at the end
of 2009 – provided that the Irish will not reject it in another referendum
slated to be held in October 2009.
Both the Constitutional Treaty as well as the Reform Treaty are set to bring
considerable change in terms of EU foreign policy – not necessarily in
names, but in substance. Most notable, for instance, is the proposition to
merge the roles of the Commissioner for External Affairs and the High Rep-
resentative into a new post: a de facto EU ‘minister for foreign affairs’ or,
in the language of the Lisbon Treaty, ‘high representative for foreign af-
fairs’. This change would ensure that the EU’s two most important external
relations tools, development and diplomacy, would work together towards
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the same goals. The High Representative for Foreign Affairs would answer
to the Council of Ministers (therefore the Member States, not the Commis-
sion), and would chair the meetings on foreign affairs. Finally, a new Ex-
ternal Action Service under the ‘High Representative of the Union for For-
eign Affairs and Security Policy’ would also replace the Unified External
Service, which currently answers to the Commission.
Clearly, the decision-makers in EU foreign policy would continue to be the
national governments, voting unanimously in the Council of Ministers and
the European Council. In summary, both the Constitutional Treaty and the
Reform Treaty were set to bridge external relations and CFSP/ESDP insti-
tutionally, yet they fell short of bringing them together legally. Thus exter-
nal relations, development policy and CFSP/ESDP remain legally distinct
ranging from a European Community competence to a shared competence
to a Member State competence. Consequently, variations in governance
patterns across policy areas as well as the issue of cross-pillarisation remain
a challenge.
Reviewing the process of treaty reform over the past decade, however, one
has to conclude that the European Union did not acquire many new areas of
European Community competence. After the failed Constitutional Treaty, it
rather seems that intergovernmental modes of governance have prevailed.
Clearly, this does not necessarily mean that the process of integration has
come to a halt; instead, there are new strategies that focus on Member
States’ willingness to comply with European integration outside the ‘Com-
munity Method’. Since the launch of the Lisbon process in 2000, several
policy areas have been subjected to exercises of bench-marking and ‘best-
practices’ (Open Method of Coordination) in order to provide less-binding
models for European integration.7 This also applies to European foreign
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7 The Open Method of Coordination (OMC), introduced by the European Council of Lis-
bon in March 2000 as part of employment policy, has been defined as a tool to reach the
Lisbon goals. The method suggests to define guidelines and timetables for achieving ob-
jectives, to establish quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks as a means
of measuring and comparing ‘best practices’, to translate European guidelines into na-
tional and regional policies, by agreeing specific measures and targets and to monitor pe-
riodically progress achieved in order to put in place mutual learning processes between
Member States. Ultimately, it is expected that this process will identify where Commu-
nity initiatives could reinforce actions at the Member State level without recurring to di-
rect EU intervention.
policy, where instances of supranational integration have been rare, and
where an increasing number of strategies – some including all policy-mak-
ing European organs (Council, Parliament and Commission) and the Mem-
ber States, such as the European Consensus on Development – have been
launched providing for some common standards and understanding in pol-
icy areas.
Still, also in the context of the European Union, the rapprochement of se-
curity and development is viewed not only in positive terms, because the
EU may be doomed to lose its reputation as a ‘civilian’ or ‘normative’ pow-
er. Over the past few years, there has been a veritable (second) debate on
the EU’s normative power as evolved since 2000. Drawing from Duchêne’s
work, Ian Manners’ adaptation of ‘civilian power Europe’ focuses on the
EU’s ability to bring conceptions of appropriate international relations into
line with its own domestic normative standards and to diffuse universal val-
ues such as peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human
rights (Manners 2002). In terms of the EU’s norm diffusion capabilities,
Manners argues that “the absence of physical force in the imposition of
norms” (Manners 2004, 5) is of paramount importance. In his 2004 recon-
sideration of ‘civilian power Europe’, Manners suspects that the ESDP mil-
itary mission led to a militarisation of the European Union which is likely
to undermine Europe’s normative power, although he maintains that some
of the EU’s civilian features may prevail. Similarly, Karen Smith agrees
with Ian Manners to the extent that the “EU repudiates civilian power by
acquiring a defence dimension” (Smith 2000, 15), but also argues that the
EU has discontinued to be a normative power, instead finding itself, “like
almost every other international actor on the planet, somewhere along a
spectrum between the two ideal-types of civilian and military power”
(Smith 2004, 16 f.). While Manners still insists that there is a way to sal-
vage the primacy of non-military, normative EU foreign policy, Smith as-
serts that the EU is about to abandon its civilian power image despite its ob-
vious weakness in defence and military matters.
It is not only within academe that concerns are being expressed regarding
the rapprochement between military (and thus security) matters and devel-
opment. Three major challenges exist: First, there is the issue of legitimacy
in supporting military measures from a development perspective. Second,
and as a consequence, the issue of neutrality or impartiality will arise; is it
possible that development cooperation and development policy is in a po-
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sition to maintain its impartiality once it has become part of a major mili-
tary-based intervention? Finally, development may risk losing its profile
and independence, a problem that has been discussed in the context of the
‘Peace Facility for Africa’ (see Box 3) underwritten by the European De-
velopment Fund (EDF).
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8 EUR 123.6 million was transferred from unallocated resources (reserves) of the 9 th Eu-
ropean Development Fund; the remaining EUR 126.4 million came from each African
ACP countries’ contribution of 1.5 % from its allocated budget.
Box 3: Peace Facility for Africa
In response to a request of the African Union (AU) summit meeting held in Ma-
puto in July 2003, the ACP-EC Council of Ministers of 11 December 2003 de-
cided to establish a Peace Facility for Africa, which has been praised “as the
EU’s single most significant financial support mechanism for Africa” (Abass
2008, 327), disbursing an initial amount of EUR 250 million for a period of three
years.8 The Council of 11 April 2006 decided to extend this initiative for the pe-
riod 2008-10, allocating EUR 300 million under the 10th European Develop-
ment Fund. This amount can be used to finance expenses incurred by African
countries deploying their peace-keeping forces in other African countries, in-
cluding the costs of transporting troops, soldiers’ living expenses and the devel-
opment of capabilities. Yet, APF funding cannot be used to cover military and
arms expenditure.
The Peace Facility is based on the principle of African ownership subscribing to
“a logic of self-responsibility” (Grimm 2009, 11) and EU-spurred efforts to
strengthen regional as well as sub-regional organisations in Africa. It supports
AU-led peacekeeping operations as well as capacity-building for the emerging
peace and security structure of the African Union (AU). It is the AU Peace and
Security Council that will make recommendations for use of APF allocations;
yet it is the Council that will ultimately make a decision. While the African
Union is required to play a key role in the decision-making process relating to
these peacekeeping operations (see Gänzle / Grimm 2008), peacekeeping oper-
ations can also be launched and implemented by African sub-regional organisa-
tions such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or
the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
3.3 Debating the European Community mandate
in development policy
Given these structural complications, one may argue that it would be ad-
vantageous to relegate development policy from the European level. What
is then the added value that EC development policy may bring to the table?
Can development policy work without trade and CFSP/EDSP? What is the
conceptual approach spelt out by development policy behind this?
First, it is the potential to provide a central point for coordination, which, at
the same time, leaves individual members with some discretionary power
to craft individual policies at the Member States level. Clearly, it can be dif-
ficult to strike a balance between individual and collective interests.
Second, the very understanding of development policy as a shared compe-
tence provides for a logic of integration that does not provide a clear-cut
differentiation between an intergovernmental or supranational approach to
European integration. As such, it implicitly builds on a logic of mutual
learning and best practices which may provide a model for any of the two
governance levels involved. By all means, and independent from the EU
context, the most basic understanding of development policy makes it em-
bracive vis-à-vis various policy arenas. It is specialised, yet not autonomous
if understood in a broader perspective.
As such, and third, and most importantly, development policy also comple-
ments the field of EU foreign policies adding a third integration logic to
(foreign) trade (community-based) and CFSP/ESDP (intergovernmental).
While EU foreign policies may be difficult to coordinate, they may also be
less prone to be dominated by just a ‘one-way-to-do things’ or one-dimen-
sional approach. Despite all possible nightmares in terms of coordination,
such an approach may also yield more differentiated and, possibly, more ef-
fective results. It is probably this particularly multi-facetted and multi-ac-
tor-based approach in EU foreign policy that generates a popular image of
the EU in global affairs – internationally as well as domestically.
Thus, fourth, and referring to the popularity of the EU as an international
actor amongst EU citizens (see various editions of the Eurobarometer),
Martin Holland made a point that popular support for European integration
requires more than just a monetary union and a single market:
Stefan Gänzle
34 German Development Institute
“A wide and comprehensive range of policies is needed in order to gener-
ate public awareness and belief in the purpose of integration. Without ex-
ternal policies such as relations with the Third World, the ‘idea’of Europe
is diminished” (Holland 2002, 244).
Fifth, and most importantly, ‘development policy’ at the European level,
can potentially shield targeted countries from more short-term interests as
they may (have to) be formulated within CFSP/ESDP or in the realm of the
Member States’ national foreign policies. From a holistic perspective of EU
foreign policies (as encompassing Member States’ foreign policies, EC ex-
ternal relations and CFSP/ESDP), development policy may be seen as the
first segment thereof moving towards a more Community-based approach
to EU foreign policy. Thus, from an integration standpoint, it would be en-
tirely mistaken for the European Union to surrender development policy to
the national level.
As Holland argues, the greatest challenge is to ensure an ever-increasing
level of consistency and coherence between the European Union and its
Member States (Holland 2002). One way to achieve this may be the agree-
ment and proper implementation of inter-institutional agreements (includ-
ing the Member States), such as the ‘European Consensus for Develop-
ment’ of 2005, and in making that policy a future success. One further con-
dition to this is that the EU development policy is in a position to respond
to specific needs of other policy areas in the realm of EU foreign policies:
one test case thereof is to find a balance between development and securi-
ty policy.
The triad of ‘peace, security and stability’ has become the leitmotiv of
many documents in the realm of EU external relations, explicitly favouring
comprehensiveness and implicitly advocating coherent policies. In particu-
lar, security and development are increasingly framed as mutually reinforc-
ing, where the EU is also competent in bringing some of its fundamental
experience to the table. Furthermore, since 2001, conflict prevention fig-
ures high on the agenda. It is worth noting that the European Security and
Defence Policy (ESDP) has been very much developed in the shadow of the
EU’s evolving conflict prevention policies. Africa, where the majority of
ESDP missions have been launched since 2003, has not only provided the
test ground for the EU’s capabilities in ESDP, but also in conflict preven-
tion.
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At the level of policy-making, it was in 1996 that the European Commis-
sion demonstrated substantially increased interest in security on the African
continent. At that time, the developmental challenge was framed in terms of
‘structural stability’:
“Structural stability is to be understood as a term denoting a dynamic sit-
uation of stability able to cope with the dynamics inherent in (emerging)
democratic societies. Structural stability could thus be defined as a situa-
tion involving sustainable economic development, democracy and respect
for human rights, viable political structures, and healthy social and envi-
ronmental conditions, with the capacity to manage change without the re-
sort to violent conflict” (European Commission 1996, 2).
Since the mid-1990s, the European Commission has contributed towards
strengthening the Community’s ‘conflict prevention teeth’ as well as
streamlining the issue in its set of cooperation policies. The Swedish EU
Council Presidency of 2001 put conflict prevention high on the agenda. The
launch of the ‘Göteborg EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Con-
flicts’ firmly anchored confliction prevention as of the main objectives of
the Union’s external relations. The European Council proposed that it
“should be integrated in all its relevant aspects, including the European Se-
curity and Defence Policy, development cooperation and trade” (European
Council 2001). The Member States thus responded to the Commission’s
analysis in its Communication on Conflict Prevention of 11 April 2001
which stated that the EU’s capacity for action in response to conflicts is in-
trinsically dependent on a clear definition of Union objectives, the capaci-
ty to act and the political will of its Member States to act (see European
Commission 2001, 30).
Since these ‘early’ policy statements, the EU has further elaborated, as we
will see in the following chapter, its stance vis-à-vis the security develop-
ment nexus – in particular in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 Sep-
tember 2001. At their first joint Council meeting on 19 November 2007 de-
velopment and defence ministers from the EU’s Member States acknowl-
edged that the nexus between development and security should continue to
inform EU strategies and policies with a view to increasing coherence of
EU external action. Confirming that security and development issues need
to be addressed complementarily, the ministers also maintained that devel-
opment and security actors are to remain distinct.
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3.4 Broadening the scope of European development
policy? Addressing development and security in
EU documents
After the end of the Cold War, EC development cooperation changed sig-
nificantly. Because the EC was not attributed with competences in the field
of development cooperation, foreign economic policy, association and co-
operation were used as legal platforms dealing with third countries from the
‘developing world’. It was only with the Treaty of Maastricht that the Com-
munity was granted shared competences in development cooperation in or-
der to complement the policies of its Member States (Art. 177–181 TEC).
Today, the European Union is the most important multilateral donor in de-
velopment cooperation.
Over the past few decades an ever-increasing focus has been put on condi-
tionality of assistance in return for delivering human rights and good gov-
ernance. It was with Lomé II in 1980 that, for the first time, human rights
were mentioned as a theme in the relationship between the EC and the
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) signatory states. A decade later, the
Lomé IV Agreement put a strong emphasis on democracy. And again, the
Cotonou Agreement of 2000 re-emphasised the role of democracy and
shifted the focus to include good governance. While the European Union
has pushed hard to expand the political acquis of the bilateral relationship,
two more major developments began to challenge the privileged position of
the ACP within the EU’s development cooperation. First, the EU market
share of this 78-country-block declined considerably from 6.7 % (1976) to
2.8 % (1994); second, the WTO urged making non-reciprocal trade con-
cessions compatible with WTO standards (Art. 1). As most of the ACP
members are not ‘least-developed countries’, the WTO would not allow for
exemptions. Consequently, the European Union started to sketch out Re-
gional Economic Partnerships which are currently under negotiation (see
Makhan 2009).
It is towards this background that historical structures of European devel-
opment cooperation were set to change. Working with the ACP is one im-
portant aspect of the European Union’s development cooperation; only 30
per cent of its ODA is reserved for least developed countries. Moreover,
through a number of different budget lines, the EU also disburses ODA
funds to the Western Balkans, Latin America, Asia and, most importantly,
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the countries of its immediate vicinity, the Mediterranean and Eastern
Neighbourhood, i.e. Ukraine, Moldova and the Caucasian Republics. With
all these activities, programmes, funding regimes and actors in play, it rais-
es the question of coherence and coordination. Key funding for ACP coun-
tries is provided under the European development fund, which is not part of
the EU’s regular budget, yet the question of its budgetisation looms large
on the agenda.
In addition, the transformation of the ACP world – constructed at a time
when the majority of these countries had close colonial ties with Europe –
is another important issue. In general, regionalisation of development co-
operation is probably the most prominent element of change, in part per-
petuated by the negotiations of the Economic Partnerships Agreements
(EPAs) with ACP countries. Thus, European development cooperation con-
tinues to make differentiations between country/region-based as well as
thematic programming. Another important driving force of change is the
modification of European governance itself. Since the adoption of the Lis-
bon agenda in 2000, the Open Method of Coordination is increasingly used
to provide strategic guidelines by focusing on non-binding templates of
‘best practices’ within the EU.
Both European institutions and Member States have decided upon a num-
ber of grand strategies providing a common frame for addressing the secu-
rity-development nexus. For reasons of space, it is not possible to refer to
all the documents here. It shall suffice to discuss the most important ones:
First, those agreements and declarations that subscribed the EU to playing
a role in conflict prevention, and, consequently, addressing the security-de-
velopment nexus, such as the Cotonou Partnership Agreement of 2000, the
‘Göteborg Programme’ and the European Security Strategy; and second,
those documents that reinforce the EU’s commitment towards policy co-
herence in, among other things, dealing with the nexus, such as the ‘Euro-
pean Consensus on Development’ and the EU Report on Policy Coherence
for Development (PCD).
3.4.1 The Cotonou Partnership Agreement
The relationship between the EU and the ACP has been governed by the
Cotonou Partnership Agreement since 2000, and revised in 2005. This
agreement replaces a succession of Lomé Conventions, and prior to those,
the Yaoundé Convention and is valid for 20 years (with the possibility for
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revision every five years). While funding for the ACP countries comes from
the European Development Fund (EDF), development cooperation with
non-ACP countries is financed through the regular EU budget. As its name
implies, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement has emphasised partnership as
a key element of the mutual relationship. The agreement has been built on
three pillars – development cooperation, trade and most importantly politi-
cal dimensions – recognising the need for a comprehensive approach to de-
velopment. Moreover, the Agreement enshrined a number of articles with
some relevance to security policy. Unlike Lomé, the Cotonou Partnership
Agreement has been a vivid expression of the EU’s increasingly political
approach to the ACP in general, and the African continent in particular; for
example, it has established a permanent political dialogue under the re-
sponsibility of the Council of Ministers.
While the Lomé Convention of 1995 mentioned human rights, democratic
principles, and the rule of law as essential elements of the partnership, the
Cotonou Partnership Agreement went one step further by including good
governance and combating corruption. On the side of the ACP, countries
can request a discussion of the coherence of EU policies, their impact on
ACP countries, and related issues. On the European side, the Union is set
to support local ownership and the progression of national development
strategies as well as work within the institutional capacities of ACP coun-
tries. A particular emphasis has been placed on the root causes of conflict,
an issue that had been taken up by the Commission’s increasing efforts in
conflict prevention policies. Most importantly, Article 11 lists those activi-
ties that are supported by the signing parties with regards to peace building,
conflict prevention and conflict resolution, including support for mediation,
negotiation and reconciliation, demobilisation of former combatants, as
well as the fight against anti-personnel landmines and the trafficking and
accumulation of small arms and light weapons, etc. Thus, Article 11 has
provided the European Union with an active role in addressing and financ-
ing operations that clearly fall within the security-development nexus.
3.4.2 The EU Programme for the Prevention of
Violent Conflicts
In its Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts (the ‘Göteborg
Programme’), the EU puts conflict prevention high on the EU agenda and
recognises the primacy of conflict prevention over crisis management. Ul-
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timately, it advocates a culture of conflict prevention. The Swedish EU
Council Presidency encouraged other Member States to streamline their na-
tional policies in a way to comply with the priorities set out in the Göteborg
Programme. Although the programme clearly identified the Political and
Security Committee as the central body within the Council dealing with
conflict prevention, it also asked the Commission to implement conflict
prevention elements in the Country Strategies. Clearly, the implementation
of the Göteborg Programme is the joint responsibility of the EU institutions
and Member States. Some Member States have developed national action
plans and strategic coordination to increase their capabilities for conflict
prevention, whereas other Member States have remained rather inactive.
Stefan Gänzle
40 German Development Institute
Box 4: The Göteborg Programme –
Finding a place for conflict prevention in EU policies
“In line with the fundamental values of the EU, the highest political priority will
be given to improving the effectiveness and coherence of its external action in
the field of conflict prevention, thereby also enhancing the preventive capabili-
ties of the international community at large. […]
The European Union, through this programme, underlines its political commit-
ment to pursue conflict prevention as one of the main objectives of the EU’s ex-
ternal relations. It resolves to continue to improve its capacity to prevent violent
conflicts and to contribute to a global culture of prevention. The Commission
communication on conflict prevention is welcomed as a major contribution to
EU capabilities for conflict prevention.
The EU will:
– set clear political priorities for preventive actions,
– improve its early warning, action and policy coherence,
– enhance its instruments for long- and short-term prevention, and
– build effective partnerships for prevention. […]
EU instruments for long- and short-term prevention
The Union has an extensive set of instruments for structural long-term and direct
short-term preventive actions. The long-term instruments include development
co-operation, trade, arms control, human rights and environment policies as well
as political dialogue. The Union also has a broad range of diplomatic and hu-
manitarian instruments for short-term prevention. Structures and capabilities for
civil and military crisis management, developed within the framework of the ES-
DP, will also contribute to the capabilities of the EU to prevent conflicts. It must
use these instruments in a more targeted and effective manner in order to address
Subsequent EU Council Presidencies have tended to neglect the Göteborg
Programme, most likely because of an event that provided a watershed in
terms of Europe’s nascent efforts in peace-building: the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 and the subsequent responses of the United States and
other allied countries. This event also provided the background for kick-
starting the EU’s cautious step towards a strategic culture in terms of secu-
rity, defence and development policy.
3.4.3 The European Security Strategy
When, after some deliberation, the European Security Strategy (ESS) was
eventually adopted in December of 2003, it was primarily designed as the
European Union’s response to the American National Security Strategy of
2002 (NSS). The NSS set out the new Bush doctrine of ‘pre-emption’ as op-
posed to deterrence and ‘pro-active counter-proliferation’ as opposed to
non-proliferation. In turn, the European Council agreed upon the European
Security Strategy by which it not only tried to initiate the formation of a Eu-
ropean strategic culture in the medium or long term, but also tried to re-
cover a common ground in European foreign policy. At that time, follow-
ing the American war in Iraq and the resulting divergent responses of the
EU Member States, a deep rift emerged within the EU.
As Faust and Messner have demonstrated, there are important areas in
which the European Security Strategy and the US Security Strategy over-
lap, but more strikingly both concepts come to very different conclusions.
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root-causes of conflict such as poverty, lack of good governance and respect for
human rights, and competition for scarce natural resources.
To strengthen EU instruments for long- and short-term prevention:
– all relevant institutions of the Union will mainstream conflict prevention with-
in their areas of competence, taking into account the 4 recommendations made
in the Commission communication on conflict prevention,
– the Commission is invited to implement its recommendations on ensuring that
its development policy and other co-operation programmes are more clearly
focused on addressing root-causes of conflicts in an integrated way within the
framework of the poverty reduction objective […].”
(see Council of Ministers 2001b)
The European Security Strategy differs in three critical aspects: First, it
calls for efforts to strengthen international law and a multilateral world or-
der; second, it places emphasis on a long-term perspective and preventive
measures as contained in conflict prevention and civil cooperation; and
third, it uses the framework of the international legal order in order to em-
bed political pressure alongside the use of robust military intervention (see
Faust / Messner 2004, 7).
It is in this context that the strategy puts strong emphasis on Europe’s ‘re-
sponsibility for global security’ as well as sketching out policy initiatives
for the European neighbourhood – in particular Eastern Europe, the Middle
Stefan Gänzle
42 German Development Institute
Box 5: Security and development in Europe’s emerging strategic thinking
“Security is a precondition of development. Conflict not only destroys infra-
structure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters
investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A number of coun-
tries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty. […]
More Coherent. The point of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Eu-
ropean Security and Defence Policy is that we are stronger when we act togeth-
er. Over recent years we have created a number of different instruments, each of
which has its own structure and rationale. The challenge now is to bring to-
gether the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance pro-
grammes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabili-
ties from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact
on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first condition for
development.
Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should fol-
low the same agenda.
In a crisis there is no substitute for unity of command. Better co-ordination be-
tween external action and Justice and Home Affairs policies is crucial in the
fight both against terrorism and organised crime.
Greater coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but also embrac-
ing the external activities of the individual Member States.
Coherent policies are also needed regionally, especially in dealing with conflict.
Problems are rarely solved on a single country basis, or without regional sup-
port, as in different ways experience in both the Balkans and West Africa shows.”
(see European Council 2003)
East and North Africa. Because of the deep insecurity felt by people world-
wide as a result of wars, poverty and disease, the ESS argues that “[s]ecu-
rity is a precondition for development. Conflict not only destroys infra-
structure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality,
deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible” (see
European Council 2003, 9 f). Although it had been more supportive of the
idea of pre-emptive engagement in previous drafts, the final version of the
ESS has become the counterpoint to the U.S. doctrine’s ‘pre-emption’, in-
stead favouring ‘preventive engagement’, an important idea from a devel-
opment perspective. The ESS identifies five key threats to Europe: terror-
ism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state
failure and organised crime.
According to Kaldor and Glasius, the “language of threats and of defence
in the European Security Strategy, which implies a statist view of the world,
rests somewhat uneasily with the global security approach that the docu-
ment seems to be espousing”(Kaldor et al. s. a., 5). Yet it also insists, in
sharp contrast to the period of the Cold War, that “none of these threats is
purely military nor can any be tackled by purely military means” (European
Council 2003, 7). Subsequently, in terms of its strategic objectives, the Eu-
ropean Union declares its willingness to address the aforementioned
threats, having singled out a somewhat special responsibility for its neigh-
bouring regions, and most importantly fostering an “effective multilateral-
ism based on an international order” (see European Council 2003, 9 f.).
This certainly is the key principle of the ESS involving the extension of in-
ternational law, the strengthening of the United Nations and cooperation
with other multilateral organisations. It argues that the EU needs to become
‘more active, more capable, more coherent’.
3.4.4 A ‘Human Security Doctrine’
for the European Union?
In an effort to complement the EU’s emerging role in security policy, a
study group9 was convened by Mary Kaldor that drafted a report proposing
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9 Members of the ‘Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities’ included Ulrich Al-
brecht, Christine Chinkin, Kemal Dervis, Renata Dwan, Anthony Giddens, Nicole Gne-
sotto, Mary Kaldor, Sonja Licht, Jan Pronk, Klaus Reinhardt, Geneviève Schméder,
Pavel Seifter, Narcís Serra.
a ‘Human Security Doctrine’ for Europe, released on 15 September 2004 at
‘Forum Barcelona’. The doctrine subscribed to a narrow definition of hu-
man security as “freedom for individuals from basic insecurities caused by
gross human rights violations” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capa-
bilities 2004, 5). The doctrine enshrined three elements: First, a set of sev-
en principles for operations in situations of severe insecurity that apply to
both ends and means (the primacy of human rights, clear political authori-
ty, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, regional focus, the use of legal
instruments, and the appropriate use of force). In this regard, the report
stressed the need for a bottom-up and participatory approach in terms of
communication, consultation, dialogue and partnership with the local pop-
ulation in order to improve early warning, intelligence gathering, mobilisa-
tion of local support, implementation and sustainability.
Second, it pleads for the creation of a ‘Human Security Response Force’,
composed of 15,000 men and women, of whom at least one third would be
civilian (police, human rights monitors, development and humanitarian
specialists, administrators, etc.). The force would be drawn from dedicated
troops and civilian capabilities already made available by Member States as
well as a proposed ‘Human Security Volunteer Service’. Third, it called for
a new legal framework to govern both the decision to intervene as well as
operations on the ground. This would build on the domestic law of host
states, the domestic law of sending states, international criminal law, inter-
national human rights law and international humanitarian law.
Furthermore, the report set out measures to increase democratic control of
security policy and to improve accountability to the local population as well
as transparent methods of financing. The Commission, in general, has
favoured integrating human security into the external policies of the Euro-
pean Union.” The Member States, however, have been relatively reluctant
in acknowledging this new norm in international relations. Interestingly
though, the ‘European Consensus on Development’ of 2005, a document
jointly signed by the European institutions and the Member States, con-
tained two references to ‘human security’; “Poverty relates to human ca-
pabilities such as consumption and food security, health, education, rights,
the ability to be heard, human security especially for the poor, dignity and
decent work” and, “It will, as part of this, also support decentralisation
and local authorities, the strengthening of the role of Parliaments, promote
human security of the poor, and the strengthening of national processes to
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ensure free, fair and transparent elections“ (Council of Ministers 2005, 7
and 26).
In the aftermath of the European Security Strategy, a number of policy doc-
uments targeted development cooperation. Furthermore, with the revision
of the Cotonou Agreement, Africa became a top priority for 2005 as with
the implementation of the African Peace Facility and the drafting of an EU
Strategy for Africa. The EU committed itself to doubling its current level of
ODA by 2010, and spent EUR 6.2 billion in terms of delivery of develop-
ment aid. In its annual policy strategy for 2005, the Commission’s devel-
opment objectives were to review and scale up the EU contribution to the
Millennium Development Goals. Most importantly, the Community and the
Member States also signed the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness and
endorsed a new tripartite development policy statement (the European Con-
sensus on Development).
3.4.5 The European Consensus on Development
On 20 December 2005, the Presidents of the Commission, European Par-
liament and the Council signed the new statement on European develop-
ment policy, the so-called ‘European Consensus on Development’, which,
for the first time in fifty years of European development cooperation, set
out the framework of common principles shared by both the EU institutions
and the Member States and provided some guidelines for implementing
both EU and national development policies in a “spirit of complementari-
ty” (Council of Ministers 2005, 5).
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Box 6: The European Consensus on Development
“Part I
6. Policy coherence for development (PCD)
37. Insecurity and violent conflict are amongst the biggest obstacles to achiev-
ing the MDGs. Security and development are important and complementary as-
pects of EU relations with third countries. Within their respective actions, they
contribute to creating a secure environment and breaking the vicious cycle of
poverty, war, environmental degradation and failing economic, social and polit-
ical structures. The EU, within the respective competences of the Community
and the Member States, will strengthen the control of its arms exports, with the
aim of avoiding that EU manufactured weaponry be used against civilian popu-
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lations or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in developing countries, and
take concrete steps to limit the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms and light
weapons, in line with the European strategy against the illicit traffic of small
arms and light weapons and their ammunitions. The EU also strongly supports
the responsibility to protect. We cannot stand by, as genocide, war crimes, eth-
nic cleansing or other gross violations of international humanitarian law and
human rights are committed. The EU will support a strengthened role for the re-
gional and sub-regional organisations in the process of enhancing internation-
al peace and security, including their capacity to coordinate donor support in
the area of conflict prevention.
7. Development, a contribution to addressing global challenges
39. EU action for development, centred on the eradication of poverty in the con-
text of sustainable development, makes an important contribution to optimising
the benefits and sharing the costs of the globalisation process more equitably for
developing countries, which is in the interests of wider peace and stability, and
the reduction of the inequalities that underlie many of the principal challenges
facing our world. A major challenge the international community must face to-
day is to ensure that globalisation is a positive force for all of mankind.
40. Reducing poverty and promoting sustainable development are objectives in
their own right. Achieving the MDGs is also in the interest of collective and in-
dividual long-term peace and security. Without peace and security development
and poverty eradication are not possible, and without development and poverty
eradication no sustainable peace will occur. Development is also the most ef-
fective long-term response to forced and illegal migration and trafficking of hu-
man beings. Development plays a key role in encouraging sustainable produc-
tion and consumption patterns that limit the harmful consequences of growth for
the environment.
Part II
Conflict prevention and fragile states
89. The Community, within the respective competences of its institutions, will de-
velop a comprehensive prevention approach to state fragility, conflict, natural
disasters and other types of crises. In this, the Community will assist partner
countries’ and regional organisations’ efforts to strengthen early warning sys-
tems and democratic governance and institutional capacity building. The Com-
munity will also, in close cooperation and coordination with existing structures
of the Council, improve its own ability to recognise early signs of state fragility
through improved joint analysis, and joint monitoring and assessments of diffi-
cult, fragile and failing states with other donors. It will actively implement the
OECD principles for good international engagement in fragile states in all pro-
gramming.
The ‘European Consensus’ consists of two parts, part one providing an out-
line of the EU’s vision of development and part two addressing the issue of
implementing Community development policy. The first part of the decla-
ration set out the objectives and principles on the basis of the Member
States’ and the Community’s commitment towards a shared vision. In the
‘European Consensus’, the European Union subscribed to the achievement
of Millennium Development Goals, i.e. to eliminate extreme poverty and
hunger, to achieve universal primary education, to promote gender equali-
ty and empower women, to reduce child mortality, to improve maternal
health, to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, to ensure envi-
ronmental sustainability and to set up a global partnership for development.
It also affirmed that the fundamental objective of poverty reduction is
closely linked with the complementary objectives of promoting good gov-
ernance and respecting human rights. The fight against poverty also implies
achieving a balance between activities aimed at human development, the
protection of natural resources and economic growth and wealth creation to
benefit the poor.
The common principles of development cooperation activities are owner-
ship and partnership, in-depth political dialogue, participation of civil soci-
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90. In difficult partnerships, fragile or failing states the Community’s immediate
priorities will be to deliver basic services and address needs, through collabo-
ration with civil society and UN organisations. The long-term vision for Com-
munity engagement is to increase ownership and continue to build legitimate, ef-
fective and resilient state institutions and an active and organised civil society,
in partnership with the country concerned.
91. The Community will continue to develop comprehensive plans for countries
where there is a significant danger of conflict, which should cover policies that
may exacerbate or reduce the risk of conflict.
92. It will maintain its support to conflict prevention and resolution and to peace
building by addressing the root-causes of violent conflict, including poverty,
degradation, exploitation and unequal distribution and access to land and nat-
ural resources, weak governance, human rights abuses and gender inequality. It
will also promote dialogue, participation and reconciliation with a view to pro-
moting peace and preventing outbreaks of violence.”
(see Council of Ministers 2005)
ety, gender equality and an ongoing commitment to preventing state fragili-
ty. Developing countries bear the primary responsibility for their own de-
velopment, but the EU accepts its share of responsibility and accountabili-
ty for the joint efforts undertaken in partnership. The European Union af-
firms that “[d]evelopment remains a long-term commitment” (Council of
Ministers 2005, 5). The EU has committed itself to increase the aid budget
to 0.7 % of the gross national product by 2015 (the shared interim goal be-
ing 0.56 % by 2010) and 50 % of the increase in aid will be earmarked for
Africa. Resource allocation will prioritise support for the least developed
countries (LDCs) and the low income and medium income countries and
will be guided by transparent needs- and performance-based criteria. The
Community declares to select a limited number of priority areas for action
thus subscribing to the principle of concentrating its country and regional
programming. In addition, the EU will monitor its commitments in order to
maximise aid effectiveness, most notably by setting concrete targets for
2010. National ownership, donor coordination and harmonisation, starting
at the field level, alignment on recipient-country systems, and results-ori-
entation are core principles in this respect. The EU will also promote better
coordination and complementarity between donors by working towards
joint multi-annual programming partner-country strategies and processes,
common implementation mechanisms and the use of co-financing arrange-
ments.
The second part of the ‘European Consensus’ focuses on the implementa-
tion of the shared vision in terms of Community policy and the policies of
the Member States. It argues that the EU’s presence on the global stage, its
expertise in dispensing aid, its support for democracy, human rights, good
governance and respect for international law as well as its role in promot-
ing partnership with developing countries and in providing a stake for civ-
il society, constitutes the Community’s added value in development policy.
Development cooperation is a major component of a broader set of exter-
nal measures, which must be consistent and complementary. Thus the Com-
munity is set to concentrate its activities in the following areas: trade and
regional integration; the environment and the sustainable management of
natural resources; infrastructures; water and energy; rural development,
agriculture, and food security; governance, democracy, human rights and
support for economic and institutional reforms; prevention of conflicts and
of state fragility; human development; and social cohesion and employ-
ment.
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The Community will strengthen mainstreaming in relation to certain issues
involving general principles applicable to any initiative and which call for
efforts in several sectors. These include democracy, good governance, hu-
man rights, the rights of children and indigenous peoples, gender equality,
environmental sustainability and the fight against HIV/AIDS.
The type of aid provided will be tailored to the needs and context of each
individual country, giving preference, where conditions allow to budgetary
aid. The Community’s approach will be based on results and performance
indicators. Most Community aid will continue to be provided as non-re-
payable grants, which are particularly suitable for the poorest countries and
for those with a limited ability to repay.
3.4.6 The EU Report on Policy Coherence
for Development (PCD)
The ‘Conclusions’ of the Council meeting in May 2005 and the ‘European
Consensus on Development’ ultimately set the reference point for assessing
the EU’s progress towards the achievement of the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals. In September 2007, the European Commission issued a report
on the state of policy coherence for development. The report was based on
Commission services and Member States’ contributions as collated through
a questionnaire distributed in January of 2007. The report recognised that
progress had been made, however, important gaps remained with regards to
institutionalising policy coherence for development.
Box 7: Security and development among the 12 PCD Commitments
“The EU will treat security and development as complementary agendas, with
the common aim of creating a secure environment and of breaking the vicious
circle of poverty, war, environmental degradation and failing economic, social
and political structures. The EU will enhance its policies in support of good and
effective governance and the prevention of state fragility and conflict, including
by strengthening its response to difficult partnerships/failing states. The EU will
strengthen the control of its arms exports, inter alia, with the aim of avoiding
that EU-manufactured weaponry be used against civilian populations or aggra-
vate existing tensions or conflicts in developing countries. The EU will promote
cooperation in fighting corruption, organised crime and terrorism.”
(see European Commission 2007)
Within the Commission, relevant mechanisms are in place like the Inter-
Service Consultations, the Impact Assessment System and the Inter-Service
Group, yet policy coherence for development has not been institutionalised
within the Council’s decision-making process – it very much depends on
the input and interest of individual presidencies and PCD is not fully insti-
tutionalised. Within the European Parliament, in turn, the Development
Committee is increasingly active in the area of policy coherence for devel-
opment, by way of issuing reports, defending positions in plenary sessions
and related activities. For Member States, the EU Report on PCD even
maintains that progress has been less than at the EU level, before assessing
the following topics: trade, environment, climate change, security, agricul-
ture, fisheries, the social dimension of globalisation, employment and de-
cent work, migration, research, information society, transport and energy.
With regards to security and development, the Commission’s working pa-
per on the EU report on PCD maintained that “ensuring coherence between
security and development is as important as it is difficult” (European Com-
mission 2007, 6). Although the EU has made efforts to strengthen the links
between these two areas, some problems have remained because of the very
nature of conflicts and “the diversity of contexts in which they erupt as well
as the complexity of the EU’s institutional set-up as a security actor consti-
tute serious challenges” (European Commission 2007, 6). There have been
initiatives ranging from integrating conflict prevention analysis to actions
for development cooperation programmes. These have addressed situations
of fragility, promoted transparency and equity in the management of natu-
ral resources, supported Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
(DDR) programmes as well as Security Sector Reform (SSR), or have been
for controlling arms exports, reducing the illicit trafficking of small arms
and light weapons, human beings, narcotics and explosives (see European
Commission 2007, 6). In addition, the report stressed the importance of co-
operation with other international actors, particularly the UN and the Or-
ganization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), but also re-
gional organisations such as the AU as well as civil society organisations.
It concluded by stating that it is still necessary to improve coordination be-
tween security and development, in particular
“[…] strengthening organisational mechanisms in the Commission and
the Council to better take account of development concerns in security de-
cisions, conducting systematically security-related analyses when inform-
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ing and guiding development cooperation, improving the transition be-
tween the different financial instruments and continuing to build and sus-
tain partnerships with the different international and regional organisa-
tions and civil society. Concrete initiatives will be considered. Further-
more, in the framework of the future joint EU-Africa strategic partnership
with a view to responding to the African continent’s requirements through
a package of increasingly integrated and cross-cutting development and
security measures” (European Commission 2007, 6).
3.5 Making the security-development nexus work
The accelerated evolution of security policy affects the broader framework
of EU policies for development. Institutionally, following the stalemate
produced by the Irish no-vote in June 2008, the question remains open as
to which trajectory the despised ‘EU Foreign Minister’ and the EU’s pro-
jected external services would ultimately follow: Would it rather emphasise
or obstruct development policy aims? Since the terrorist attacks of 2001,
concerns with counter-terrorism and weapons of mass destruction have had
a considerable impact on priorities for EC external assistance. EU aid to
Pakistan, which significantly increased after September 11, explicitly re-
ferred to the country’s decision to support the international coalition against
terrorism. The revised Cotonou Agreement included a clause which con-
firms partners’ international cooperation in the fight against terrorism.
Although most spending on these new priorities does not appear to divert
funding to development assistance, these policies clearly prioritise the EU
security preoccupations of European politicians, at the expense of poverty
reduction. However, as the key documents (analysed above) have indicat-
ed, the ultimate aim of European external policies is the bridging of the se-
curity-development nexus. Since 1999, concern with conflict prevention
and post-conflict reconstruction has increasingly been integrated into de-
velopment programmes. Programming instruments, such as Country Strat-
egy Papers and Regional Strategy Papers have been elaborated and have in-
tegrated aid, trade and political dimensions. The Commission routinely
looks at the root causes for conflict which are regularly reported from their
country delegations. On the basis of these assessments, external assistance
takes into account conflict prevention measures. Within the EU institutions,
in particular between the Council and the Commission, the Committee for
Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) has been established as
The European Community’s Instrument for Stability
German Development Institute 51
a platform for reconciling security and development goals. The Commis-
sion’s Conflict Prevention Unit of DG RELEX has developed expertise in
the fields of security sector reform, mediation, reconciliation, etc.
That the renewed interest in security will in fact strengthen development
aims fundamentally depends on the conception of security to which the Eu-
ropean Union will subscribe. With regards to the Instrument for Stability,
the Budget Committee of the European Parliament stated:
“In any event, actions relating to peace-support operations should not re-
flect the security interests of the donors but of the beneficiaries. Likewise,
in the case of security-related operations, European security interests and
the interests of the beneficiary countries in terms of stability and develop-
ment should not be confused” (European Parliament 2006, 78).
Thus, if the EU’s conception goes further in the direction proscribed by the
European Security Strategy – i.e. of contributing to global security by us-
ing the full range of EU instruments, but at the same time emphasising mul-
tilateralism and law-enforcement –, then it could be beneficial to develop-
ment policies. As a means to reinforce the link between development and
security, the Instrument for Stability had been fleshed out.
4 The Making of a new instrument in EC external
relations: The Instrument for Stability
4.1 A new Community tool to address the
‘security-development nexus’
On the European Commission’s external relations website, the Instrument
for Stability (IfS) or, alternatively, the ‘Stability Instrument’, which was
created as part of the reform of the Community’s external financing instru-
ments in 2006, is introduced by explicit reference to the mutual relationship
that exists between security and development:
“Security is not only a primary concern of peoples, but also a precondi-
tion to development. With the aim to directly improve the living conditions
in partner countries and to lay down a basis for their sustainable devel-
opment, the EU is committed to help establish and maintain stability and
security worldwide” (see European Commission 2008b).
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The European Commission attempts to frame the Instrument for Stability
as the Community’s flagship-like instrument whose main purpose is to ad-
dress what has been described as the ‘security-development nexus’ over the
past two decades.
Consequently, expectations were relatively high vis-à-vis the IfS as it had
been designed to equip the EU with a “strategic tool to address a number
of global security and development challenges” (European Commission
2006, 3). In a nutshell, it constitutes the EC’s main thematic tool operating
in the “grey zone of security and development policy” (Interview 2) and
providing for development cooperation measures, as well as financial, eco-
nomic and technical cooperation measures with partner countries in crisis
and conflict as well as post-crisis and conflict situations. At the same time
concerns were levied as to whether or not the IfS would be in a position to
effectively walk the ‘thin line’ between security and development, neither
infringing on the prerogatives of the one or the other by eventually ‘securi-
tising development’ or ‘developmentalising security policy.’
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Figure 2: IfS – Linking external relations, development and CFSP
within the EU
Source: Author
After a painstakingly difficult inter-institutional negotiation process involv-
ing the European Commission, the Council and, eventually, the European
Parliament in 2005 and 2006, the Instrument for Stability entered into force
on 1 January 2007. European policy-makers and members of the European
Commission at that time were full of praise for this “major new Communi-
ty instrument” (Landaburu 2006, 37) applauding “[…] the combined effect
of the Stability Instrument and the CFSP budget [which] will markedly en-
hance the EU’s capacity to engage in civilian crisis” (Ferrero-Waldner /
Ahtisaari 2006, 3). In addition to possibly enhancing cooperation across
pillars, the European Commissioner for External Relations and European
Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner also stressed the instru-
ments capacity to improve not only inter-institutional coordination but also
EU Member States’ coherence10 in response to emerging crises and con-
flicts:
“Finally, the creation of the Stability Instrument reflects our desire to
streamline our crisis response [… ] In particular, it is desirable to use the
Stability Instrument in order to strengthen the collaboration between the
European Council, the European Commission and the Member States”
(Ferrero-Waldner 2006b, 34).
Ever since the question loomed on the EU’s agenda how much coordination
there should be in terms of getting this Community tool aligned with the
praxis of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) or the European
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). These challenges are commonly re-
ferred to as ‘cross-pillarisation’ in the area of EU foreign policy (Stetter
2004). This process “which resembles increased interconnectivity between
EC external policies” (Herrmann 2007, 6) entails hard choices in terms of
the selecting the correct legal basis. Recent times have shown a clear trend
towards integration rather than separation of policies falling under pillar I
or pillar II jurisdiction. In particular since the entry into force of the Nice
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10 On the term ‘coherence’ see (Ashoff 2005, 40): In a plea for a realistic understanding of
the concept, Ashoff underlines that “[e]fforts to improve coherence are undertaken
against a background of tension between possibly competing societal and political norms
(e.g. coherence versus participation) and competing overriding objectives […] [These ef-
forts] remain a process of trial and error and are not immune to setbacks in the political
clash of differing interests. If perfect coherence cannot be achieved, it is all the more im-
portant to discuss the competing normative and political claims and interests […].”
Treaty, this development is driven by an increasing number of civil CFSP
activities, which might also be considered as falling under the EC’s coop-
eration policies governed by Art. 181 a. Furthermore, a broader notion of
security brings development policies closer to the realm of ‘high politics’
and ‘foreign policy’ (Hoffmeister 2008).
The Treaty of the European Union enshrines the principle that the Commu-
nity Method – even in the advent of the intergovernmental CFSP (and Jus-
tice and Home Affairs – i.e. the second and third pillar) is to be observed
and, more importantly, be applied whenever appropriate.
“Subject to the provisions amending the Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community with a view to establishing the European Commu-
nity, the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community and
the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, and to
these final provisions, nothing in this Treaty shall affect the Treaties es-
tablishing the European Communities or the subsequent Treaties and Acts
modifying or supplementing them“ (Article 3 [2] TEU).
Furthermore, Article 47 TEU implies that the European Court of Justice
(ECJ), who does not have a role in matters of pillar II, is entitled to rule on
issues of competence delimitation between the different pillars. This judi-
cial right is particularly important in a policy area, which is cross-cutting in
its nature, such as security and development. In contrast, coherence – at the
horizontal, institutional and vertical level – between various policies of the
EU is not subject to judicial review by the ECJ; thus it remains a political
claim urging actors to observe coherence within policies, institutions and
Member States. This is not to say that coherence is impossible to achieve;
yet, the mechanisms for convergence are ultimately different.
Prior to the launch of the Instrument for Stability, the European Commis-
sion had at its disposal a financing instrument which to some extent tack-
led the issues of rapidity and scope in terms of responding to crisis situa-
tions. Thus, the Instrument for Stability is not entirely ‘new’: It is as much
a product shaped by increasing EU-wide concern for effectively bridging
the security-development nexus as it path-dependently replaces a host of
post-crisis EC budget lines, one of which the so-called Rapid Reaction
Mechanism (RRM).
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4.2 The Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM)
as predecessor: Scope and objectives
It was already in December 1999 that the Helsinki European Council called
upon the Commission to set up a ‘Rapid Reaction Facility’ as part of its de-
cisions on the creation of a European Security and Defence Policy:
“Member States and the Union should develop a rapid reaction capabili-
ty by defining a framework and modalities, as well as by pre-identifying
personnel, material and financial resources that could be used in response
to a request of a lead agency like the UN or the OSCE, or, where appro-
priate, in autonomous EU actions. […] Rapid financing mechanisms such
as the creation by the Commission of a Rapid Reaction Fund should be set
up to allow the acceleration of the provision of finance to support EU ac-
tivities, to contribute to operations run by other international organisa-
tions and to fund NGO activities, as appropriate” (European Council
1999).
Council Regulation (EC) 381/2001 of 26 February 2001 created the Rapid
Reaction Mechanism; it entered into force on 2 March 2001 and expired on
31 December 2006. The Rapid Reaction Mechanism supplemented a num-
ber of specialised financing instruments, which contain emergency provi-
sions allowing rapid mobilisation of funds. They included, for example, the
Regulations on Food Aid, Human Rights and Democratisation, Mine Ac-
tion and Rehabilitation. The RRM did not establish programmes in its own
right, but rather provided for a mechanism aiming to accelerate a number
of financial instruments.11 Its purpose was not the creation of a new geo-
graphic programme focussing on developing countries, but rather to enable
a horizontal approach for EC action in crisis response in general, legally
based on the EC flexibility clause, Article 308 TEU.12 Had it been built on
Article 179 TEC of title XX on development cooperation, the Community
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11 The financial instruments were mentioned in the annex to the RRM regulation.
12 See Article 308 TEC (former Art. 235) states: “If action by the Community should prove
necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the ob-
jectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the
Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consul-
ting the European Parliament, take the appropriate measures.”
would not have been in a position to respond to crisis situations in devel-
oped countries.13
According to Article 114 of the regulation, the Rapid Reaction Mechanism
was designed to allow the Community to respond in a rapid, efficient and
flexible manner to urgent situations or to the emergence of crises. Article 2
(1) confirmed that the RRM builds upon all the existing legal instruments
of the EC, as listed in the annex to this regulation. According to Article 2
(2), the RRM may stipulate an action if it cannot be undertaken “within a
reasonable time limit under the existing legal instruments […] and if the
action is ‘limited in time’” – which from Art. 8 (2) means that the action
should normally not take more than six months. Article 3 (1) states that the
RRM “may be triggered when in the beneficiary countries concerned there
occur situations of crisis or emerging crisis, situations posing a threat to
law and order, the security and safety of individuals, situations threatening
to escalate into armed conflict or to destabilise the country and where such
situations are likely to jeopardise the beneficial effects of assistance and co-
operation policies and programmes […]” However, the regulation covering
the RRM excluded the financing of humanitarian assistance. Article 10 stip-
ulates that the Commission “ensures that action taken is effectively coordi-
nated with action by the Member States, including on the ground. This ac-
tion must be coherent, complementary and effective. The Commission must
also promote cooperation with international and regional organisations.”
Eligible for funding are EU Member States, the beneficiary countries and
their agencies, regional and international organisations and agencies, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and public and private operators with
appropriate specialised expertise and experience. As regards NGOs and pri-
vate operators, certain criteria must be met, as detailed in the regulation,
such as technical and management capacities, previous experiences, and
other criteria relating to their records and guarantees.
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13 See Article 179 TEC: “1. Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty, the
Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251, shall adopt
the measures necessary to further the objectives referred to in Article 177. Such meas-
ures may take the form of multi-annual programmes. […] 3.The provisions of this Arti-
cle shall not affect cooperation with the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries in the
framework of the ACP-EC Convention.”
14 If not stated otherwise, article numbers in this section refer to the RRM regulation.
Finally, the Commission implemented the Rapid Reaction Mechanism
without having recourse to procedures and principles of EU comitology
(see Box 8). Yet before taking or implementing a decision, the Commission
was required to inform the Council, and to “duly take into account the ap-
proach adopted by the Council, in the interests of the cohesion of EU ex-
ternal activities” (Council of Ministers 2001a, 6). Although the RRM was
not exclusively designed to respond to conflict prevention, many of its in-
terventions had a conflict prevention component. Focusing on conflict-pre-
vention and peace-building, RRM initiatives between 2001 and 2006 pri-
marily targeted countries in South-East and Eastern Europe, Central Asia
and Sub-Saharan Africa.15
The RRM was used, for instance, to relieve the effects of the December
2004 tsunami, the Aceh Peace Process, the EU Border Assistance Mission
(EUBAM) to the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, and as a response to a
series of other crises in Africa, Latin America, the Western Balkans and the
Middle East. In the case of the Aceh Monitoring Mission, the first ESDP
mission to be involved in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
(DDR), the RRM provided direct support to the Crisis Management Initia-
tive (CMI), a non-governmental organisation chaired by former Finnish
President and Nobel-prize laureate Martti Ahtisaari. Following a memoran-
dum of understanding signed on 15 August 2005 by the government of
Indonesia and the ‘Free Aceh’ movement, the Aceh Monitoring Mission –
a civilian mission within the framework of ESDP – was launched on 15
September 2005.16 Five ASEAN contributing countries (Brunei, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) as well as Norway and Switzerland
joined this EU-led mission. The costs of the mission were financed from the
CFSP budget and by contributions of the EU Member States and partici-
pating countries (see EU Council Secretariat 2005).
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15 RRM-beneficiary countries included Afghanistan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bu-
rundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Cote d’Ivoire, East Timor, FYR of Macedonia, Georgia, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon,
Liberia, Libya, the Maldives, Moldova, Nepal, the Palestinian Territories, Sri Lanka, Su-
dan, and Ukraine as well as regional initiatives in Central Asia and the Horn of Africa.
16 The mission expired on 15 March 2006.
When compared to existing EC cooperation tools and mechanisms, the
RRM exhibits two innovative features: speed and breadth. It was an inde-
pendent instrument equipped with its own budget line and with a broad
scope of applicability mirroring the Commission’s increasing global ‘en-
gagement’. Whenever an action was possible under any of the geographi-
cal or thematic instruments listed in the annex of the RRM regulation, it
could be undertaken. Thus, in principle, actions could be carried out in
TACIS-recipient countries even if that action would not be possible under
the geographical programme (see Martenczuk 2004, 205). Yet, as stated
earlier, the annual budget for the RRM was relatively small, on average
around EUR 30 million per year, thus putting some financial constraints on
each measure.
4.3 The European Commission proposal for an
Instrument for Stability and the interinstitutional
negotiation process
The EU’s response to emerging crises has often been criticised as slow,
cumbersome and as a result ineffective. Although there was a plethora of
available budget lines in the realm of external relations that covered vari-
ous aspects of crisis and conflict situations, there was no single and unified
instrument that could have been initiated on very short notice and imple-
mented rapidly. Furthermore, according to a senior official of the European
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Box 8: EU comitology as institutional bridge between Member States
and Community
The primary task of committees, which are involved at all stages of a legislative
or policy-making process, is to assist the Community institutions. Depending on
the policy area, the committees consist of representatives from Member States
or the private sector and are chaired by the European Commission. They enable
the Commission to establish dialogue with national administrations and well be-
fore adopting implementing measures. The Commission thus has a chance to en-
sure that measures reflect as far as possible the situation in each of the countries
concerned. Furthermore, Parliament has the right to monitor the implementation
of legislative instruments adopted under the co-decision procedure, a right,
which equips Parliament with a role vis-à-vis the Instrument for Stability as well.
Commission, it “[…] would normally take up to two years to start an EC
response cycle using long-term development cooperation instruments, in-
volving the composition of a concept paper, the approval of an indicative
programme and a multi-annual programme” (Interview 2).
To mitigate this situation, the European Commission submitted a proposal
for a regulation of the Council establishing an Instrument for Stability on
29 September 2004. The objectives have been to “support the policies of
the EU relating to:
– the delivery of an effective, timely and integrated response in order to
prevent, attenuate or address the consequences of crisis situations, se-
vere political instability or violent conflict;
– major challenges to the establishment or preservation of the rule of law
in third countries, including the fight against regional or trans-border
challenges such as organised crime, trafficking and terrorism;
– major technological threats with potential trans-border impact, includ-
ing the promotion of nuclear safety and the fight against the prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruction;
– the development of peace-keeping and peace-support capacity in part-
nership with international, regional and sub-regional organisations”
(European Commission 2004, 14).
It becomes clear that the Commission extensively referred to security poli-
cy, framing peace-keeping and peace-support topics as Community tasks.
These ambitions did not meet with Member States’ support; the incriminat-
ed concepts such as ‘peace-keeping’ and ‘peace-support’ were subsequent-
ly eliminated from the text of regulation. Furthermore, the suggested inclu-
sion of nuclear safety and the fight against the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction raised some legal concerns, which had to be solved with
the involvement of the legal services of the EU institutions. The difficult
trajectory of the negotiations over the final text of this regulation has served
to elucidate the challenges that the security-development nexus faces at the
European level.
Whereas the Rapid Reaction Mechanism needed to be based on Article 308
TEC, the 2003 Treaty of Nice allowed the new Article 181a TEC to be used
for measures of cooperation policy vis-à-vis developed countries. Despite
this opportunity, the European Commission decided to revert to Article 308:
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“The proposal is based on Article 308 of the Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Community, coupled with Article 203 of the Treaty establishing the
European Atomic Energy Community. The Euratom legal base is required
in order to cover the nuclear safety aspects of the proposal. The civilian
aspects of crisis response would normally come within the scope of Arti-
cles 179 and 181a of the EC Treaty. However, the provisions relating to the
financing of peace keeping, in particular, while clearly contributing to the
objectives of Articles 179 and 181a, justify a legal basis in Article 308 of
the Treaty. Moreover, Articles 179 and 181a are not legally compatible
with Article 203 of the Euratom Treaty” (European Commission 2004, 2).
It therefore seems that the Commission hoped for an arrangement with the
Council, bringing security and development closer together in terms of a
Commission/Council collaboration that would effectively bridge pillars I
and II. However, this came at a price: it reduced the European Parliament’s
role to a quantité négligeable, namely a consulting body with little stake in
the decision-making. In contrast, however, Hoffmeister suggests that the
Commission had been sympathetic to the idea of using Article 181a TEC,
yet decided to continue using Article 308 TEC for two reasons: First, to en-
sure the financing of peacekeeping missions; second, the Commission was
concerned that there was no available legal foundation for external action
in the field of nuclear safety (see Hoffmeister 2008, 62).
In principle, the question boiled down to whether or not the European Par-
liament should have a say in the Community’s external instruments, or
whether it should be constrained to consultation, as would be the case if im-
plementation was to be based on Art. 308. With the support of the Parlia-
ment’s legal service, the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) now
started to press hard for the use of Art. 179 and 181 as the legal basis, and
suggested excluding nuclear safety issues from the text of the regulation in
order to avoid any further legal complications. Consequently, the European
Parliament rejected the Commission’s draft proposal in March 2005 –
though “as part of the package on all financing instruments” as confirmed
by an administrator of the European Parliament’s foreign affairs committee
(Interview 4). In addition, the European Parliament also had (and still has)
reservations regarding on-going support granted to long-standing conver-
sion centres and institutes for the study of terrorism, such as the ones based
respectively in Kiev and Algiers (see European Parliament 2008).
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Far from presenting a homogenous bloc in the Council, the EU Member
States were also sceptical about the scope of the instrument to be created
(Interview 1). Hoffmeister suggests that, in principle, three options
emerged within the Council: First, to skip the Instrument for Stability (IfS)
altogether and to integrate parts of it into the instrument for development
cooperation; second, to proceed with the Commission proposal; or third, to
reduce the regulation on the IfS to those elements that are covered by Com-
munity law (see Hoffmeister 2008, 62).
In 2006, the subsequent inter-institutional process involved the European
Parliament, the Commission and the Council, with intensive negotiations
further complicated by a pending court ruling on the Community’s compe-
tence in small arms collection. According to a Finnish diplomat, who was
in charge of the EC External instruments including the IfS at the time of the
Finnish EU Council Presidency in the second half of 2006, there were at
least two camps discernible. One favoured a wide and community-friendly
approach, while the other – advocated by the big Member States – was in-
terested in a more limited scope of action for the IfS. By and large, Finland
at that time favoured the Community-friendly interpretation of the Com-
mission proposal without being overly supportive of the Commission be-
cause of its Presidency (Interview 1).
In addition to the difficult issues surrounding the development-security
nexus from a legal perspective, the European Parliament insisted on the in-
clusion of a Peace-building Partnership. In her letter of 7 June 2006 to the
chairman of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hu-
man Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy, Elmar Brok, EU Com-
missioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner’s acknowledged that “the Commission
has been particularly attentive to the Committee’s report on the Instrument
for Stability” (Ferrero-Waldner 2006a, 2). The Parliament’s Rapporteur on
the proposal for the IfS, Angelika Beer (The Greens/European Free Al-
liance), had been eager to include such provisions. To some extent, Beer re-
connected with a tradition within the German Green Party.
In 1995, Alexander Langer, an Italian Green Member of the European Par-
liament from Alto Adige, South Tyrol, started to campaign for the idea of a
European Civilian Peace Corps “to give a multinational and non-violent in-
strument to the nascent Common Foreign and Security Policy” (Berruti /
Rossi 2003, 4). Ultimately, however, the final draft of the IfS regulation on-
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ly allowed standing civilian capacities to be mobilised in conjunction with
external organisations.
The scope of the Peace-building Partnership (PBP), as suggested by Beni-
ta Ferrero-Waldner, was far more modest, and intended to build the PBP
around six points, including a representative network of specialised Euro-
pean NGOs, the financial support to build capacity amongst NGOs, a
framework partnership agreements with specialised NGOs allowing for
rapid provision of support to peace-building assistance, the development of
operational capacity within Commission, the establishment of regional
hubs within Commission’s delegations and strengthened cooperation with
Member States specialised agencies (see Ferrero-Waldner 2006a, 2).
At the end of the three party talks, the Council presented a draft which ac-
knowledged the Parliament’s (and the Commission’s) ambition for a Peace-
building Partnership, inasmuch as they chose Articles 179 and 181 (a) as
the legal basis for the regulation. Eventually, the Council also separated the
issues concerning nuclear safety from IfS issues, and transferred the former
to other regulations (Regulation No. 300/2007 [Euratom]). Furthermore,
the final draft also eliminated references to peace-keeping and -building,
which resulted in criticism from both the European Commission and the
Parliament. The European Parliament’s foreign affairs committee argued
that measures for peace support and disarmament are Community compe-
tences; the judicial service issued the opinion that civilian aspects of re-
sponses to crisis situations are covered by Article 179 und 181a TEC, and
the committee for international trade proposed to maintain a reference to
non-military, peace-building measures (see Hoffmeister 2008, 62 f.).
On 6 July 2006, the European Parliament accepted the Commission pro-
posal with a number of amendments in its first reading, with the Council
agreeing on the final text in its meeting on 7 November 2006. Thus, the reg-
ulation was set to enter into force on 1 January 2007. As for the European
Parliament, Angelika Beer celebrated the adoption of the IfS as a great suc-
cess:
“To be more specific, the Stability Instrument was adopted in the form of
an EU regulation in accordance with the co-decision procedure. That is,
the Parliament was fully involved in its development and I myself spent
one and a half years on negotiating with the Commission and Council. In
fact, it was the first time the Parliament was granted the right of co-deci-
sion in the foreign policy area” (Beer 2007).
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Not only was the inter-institutional negotiation process attentively fol-
lowed, but it was also lobbied by NGOs. According to several interviewees
from the EP administration (Interview 4 and 5), the Brussels-based Euro-
pean Peace-building Liaison Office (EPLO) had been particularly success-
ful in gaining direct access to Beer and lobbying for the introduction of the
Peace-building Partnership. The EPLO was already welcoming the Instru-
ment for Stability in its commentary of March 2006 (see European Peace-
building Liaison Office 2006). At the same time, the EPLO expressed its
hopes that the concurrent legal uncertainties would not infringe upon the
general benefits that would be reaped from the IfS in terms of conflict pre-
vention and crisis response at the EU level. Therefore, most of its com-
ments were geared towards strengthening the civilian contributions towards
disarmament, security sector reform and restriction of small arms and light
weapons. With a ruling by the ECJ pending as a backdrop, these issues had
been catapulted to the forefront of discussions on the IfS.
The three-party deliberations on the IfS regulation took place in the shad-
ow of a pending court case: In July 2002 the Council adopted in the frame-
work of CFSP and on the basis of the EU Treaty, a joint action concerning
the combating of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. In or-
der to implement that joint action, the Council adopted a decision on 2 De-
cember 2004, the basis being a European Union contribution to the Eco-
nomic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the framework of
the Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons. Following the Council
decision the Commission requested that the ECJ annul it, because the Com-
mission took the view that it was not adopted on the correct legal basis.
Even during the discussion of the drafting of the decision, the Commission
declared that in its view the matter fell under Community development co-
operation policy and more specifically, the Cotonou Agreement, and hence-
forth, should not be adopted under the EU Treaty and on the basis of the
CFSP. On 20 May 2008 the ECJ ruled in favour of the Commission – with
some important repercussions for the Instrument for Stability (see Euro-
pean Court of Justice 2008).
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4.4 The Regulation on the Instrument for Stability:
Policy content and objectives
4.4.1 The Instrument for Stability and other EC external
relations funding mechanisms
In contrast to the four main geographic policy instruments – the European
Development Fund (EDF), the Development Cooperation Instrument
(DCI), the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)
and the Instrument for Pre-accession (IPA) – there are only relatively small
amounts of financing available for the thematic instruments. For the year
2007, for instance, EUR 232 million have been allocated to the Instrument
for Stability.
Still, this amount is slightly higher than the Union’s budget for CFSP,
which is at about EUR 150 million annually. If one ‘somewhat’ combines
both budget lines, however, and this certainly is part of the IfS’ thrust, then
the European Union gains significantly in terms of its overall capacity in
external relations. It may even yield more strength if the 10th European De-
Figure 3: Funding allocations 2007–2013 (EUR billion)
(EDF figures relate to 2008–13)
Source: European Commission (2006, 20)
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17 If not stated otherwise, article numbers in this section refer to the IfS regulation.
velopment Fund (EDF) is brought into perspective which makes EUR 22.7
billion available for the 78 African, Caribbean and Pacific states for the en-
tire financial period of 2008-2013.
4.4.2 Scope and objectives
Subdivided into a short-term and a long-term component, the IfS pursues a
threefold operational goal: First, in a situation of emerging political crisis
or natural disaster, it seeks to contribute to stability by providing an effec-
tive response to help preserve, establish or re-establish the conditions es-
sential to the proper implementation of the EC development and coopera-
tion policies (Development Cooperation Instrument, European Neighbour-
hood and Partnership Instrument, etc.). Thus, the IfS would (1) address a
new political crisis or natural disaster (e.g. Lebanon crisis in 2006, Tsuna-
mi in 2005), (2) respond to a ‘window of opportunity’ to pre-empt a crisis
(e.g. Gaza withdrawal of Israeli forces in 2009), (3) secure the conditions
for delivery of EC assistance (e.g. in Afghanistan) and (4) be part of a joint
approach involving ESDP operations (e.g. EUFOR Chad/RCA) (see 1–4 in
Figure 4). Second, in the context of stable conditions, in turn, it aims to im-
prove capacity to address specific global and trans-regional threats having
a destabilising effect, such as for instance proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and human trafficking, terrorism and organised crime. Third,
again in a situation of stable conditions, it seeks, to ensure international and
regional organisations, as well as state and non-state actors’ preparedness to
respond to pre- and post-crisis situations.
Article 117 of the regulation from 15 November 2006 expounds two distinct
but inter-related objectives that are respectively characterised by a short and
long-term perspective, but with both perspectives emphasising the long-
term objective of preparing the ground for re-establishing the Community’s
regular development and cooperation policy programmes:
“[…] In accordance with the objectives of such cooperation and within its
limits as laid down in the EC Treaty, the specific aims of this Regulation
shall be:
(a) in a situation of crisis or emerging crisis, to contribute to stability by
providing an effective response to help preserve, establish or re-establish
the conditions essential to the proper implementation of the Community’s
development and cooperation policies;
(b) in the context of stable conditions for the implementation of Commu-
nity cooperation policies in third countries, to help build capacity both to
address specific global and transregional threats having a destabilising
effect and to ensure preparedness to address pre- and post-crisis situa-
tions.”
Furthermore, Article 1 (3) mandates that any measure enacted by the In-
strument for Stability “may be complementary to, and shall be consistent
with, without prejudice to, measures adopted” under CFSP and Police and
Judicial Cooperation (title V and VI). Article 2 focuses on complementari-
ty of community assistance, requiring IfS to operationalise only in cases
where an “adequate and effective response cannot be provided” through
Community assistance instruments. The Commission is called upon to en-
sure consistency “with the Community’s overall strategic policy framework
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Figure 4: IfS intervention in crisis/conflict cycle
Source: Author
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for the partner country” (Art. 2 [2]) and to “promote close coordination be-
tween its own activities and those of the Member States” (Art. 2 [3]).
Finally, Article 3 (1) lays out the condition for Community assistance in re-
sponse to crisis situations:
“Community technical and financial assistance […] may be undertaken in
response to a situation of urgency, crisis or emerging crisis, a situation
posing a threat to democracy, law and order, the protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, or the security and safety of individuals,
or a situation threatening to escalate into armed conflict or severely to
destabilise the third country or countries concerned.”
Interestingly, such measures may also address situations where the Com-
munity has invoked the essential elements clauses of international agree-
ments with a view to suspending, either partially or totally, cooperation
with third countries. Subsequently, Article 3 (2) enumerates sixteen areas,
which are covered by the Instrument for Stability. For instance, they include
measures in the area of conflict prevention and management through “the
provision of technical and logistical assistance, for the efforts undertaken
by international and regional organisations, state and non-state actors in
promoting confidence-building, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation”
(Art. 3 [1] a), as well as the “support for the establishment and the func-
tioning of interim administrations mandated in accordance with interna-
tional law” (3 [1] b). The promotion of democracy, rule of law and human
rights is evident by
“support for the development of democratic, pluralistic state institutions,
including measures to enhance the role of women in such institutions, ef-
fective civilian administration and related legal frameworks at national
and local level, an independent judiciary, good governance and law and
order, including non-military technical cooperation to strengthen overall
civilian control, and oversight over the security system and measures to
strengthen the capacity of law enforcement and judicial authorities in-
volved in the fight against the illicit trafficking of people, drugs, firearms
and explosive materials.”
Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration is provided via the “support
for civilian measures related to the demobilisation and reintegration of for-
mer combatants into civil society, and where appropriate their repatriation,
as well as measures to address the situation of child soldiers and female
combatants” (Art. 3 [21] f), and, “support for measures to address, within
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the framework of Community cooperation policies and their objectives, the
socio-economic impact on the civilian population of anti-personnel land-
mines, unexploded ordnance or explosive remnants of war; activities fi-
nanced under this Regulation shall cover risk education, victim assistance,
mine detection and clearance and, in conjunction therewith, stockpile de-
struction” (Art. 3 [21] h).
In a nutshell, the short term-component of the Instrument for Stability is
used to re-establish the conditions necessary to implement the EC’s devel-
opment assistance programmes under other long-term instruments. It fo-
cuses on situations of urgency, crisis and emerging crisis, situations posing
threats to democracy, law and order, the protection of human rights and fun-
damental freedoms, the security and safety of individuals, or on situations
threatening to escalate into armed conflict or severely destabilise third
countries. Under this component, the IfS can only be triggered in a situa-
tion of crisis or emerging crisis and aims at complementing long-term pro-
grammes under relevant geographic financing instruments, thus providing
support in two phases including emergency response measures and interim
response programmes with a duration of no more than 18 months.
Article 4 then describes the conditions to be met for assistance in the con-
text of stable conditions for cooperation, and is used as capacity-building
tool with a three-pronged objective: It involves “threats to law and order, to
the security and safety of individuals, to critical infrastructure and to pub-
lic health” (Art. 4 [1]); “risk mitigation and preparedness relating to chem-
ical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials or agents” (Art. 4 [2]);
and “pre- and post-crisis capacity building” (Art. 4 [3]).
Article 4 (1) is notable for including the fight against organised crime, traf-
ficking (i.e. in drugs, small arms and light weapons, or human beings) as
well as terrorism. Those threats are all trans-regional and global by nature
and require enhanced trans-regional and global cooperation and coordina-
tion, which is what is particularly intended by the IfS. Constituted and sup-
ported by different forms of illicit trafficking, those activities themselves
constitute – along with other forms of criminal enterprise – threats to licit
international flows of goods, money, services, and people, all of which are
essential to the security of peoples, countries and regions. In a repressive
and preventive perspective, the IfS, therefore, intends to fight both the ‘neg-
ative’ flows of criminal enterprise as well as protect the ‘positive’ flows of
licit activities, in order to prevent their disruption.
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Article 4 (2) focuses on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and aims at contributing to risk mitigation and preparedness relating to the
illicit spread of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) ma-
terials or agents along with their means of delivery. It provides technical
and financial assistance covering activities such as the promotion of civil-
ian research as an alternative to defence-related research, the enhancement
of safety practices related to civilian facilities where sensitive materials or
agents are stored, the establishment of civil infrastructure and civilian stud-
ies for the dismantlement, remediation or conversion of weapons related fa-
cilities and sites no longer belonging to a defence programme, strengthen-
ing the capacity of competent civilian authorities and enforcement of ef-
fective control of illicit trafficking in CBRN materials and agents, the de-
velopment of the legal framework and institutional capacities for establish-
ment and enforcement of support controls on dual-use goods as well as the
enhancement of civilian disaster preparedness, emergency planning and ca-
pabilities for clean-up measures in relation to possible major environmen-
tal incidents in this field.
Article 4 (3) identifies the enhancement of pre- and post-crisis capacity-
building and aims at enhancing pre- and post-crisis preparedness through
long-term measures. Acknowledging the capacity gaps in the international
system in the pre-crisis and early recovery phases, the EU wishes, through
this priority, to make an upstream investment in the response capacity of its
major implementing partners by helping to build and strengthen the capac-
ity of international, regional and sub-regional organisations as well as state
and non-state actors in order to promote early warning, confidence-build-
ing, mediation and reconciliation on the one hand, and to improve post-con-
flict and post-disaster recovery. The technical and financial assistance pro-
vided under this priority covers activities such as the transfer of know-how,
the exchange of information, risk/threat assessment, research and analysis,
early warning systems and training. It can also, if appropriate, be directed
at the implementation of measures recommended by the United Nations
Peace-building Commission (UNPBC). Some scholars have suggested that
“[w]hile [the Stability Instrument] clearly combines a number of former-
ly separate instruments, it does not as yet provide a clear perspective on
the future of other instruments such as the African Peace Facility. Article
4 (3) of the regulation establishing the instrument for stability would
nonetheless seem to suggest some ways of complementing, if not replac-
ing, the APF. Certainly, this new instrument will be the object of further
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inter-institutional negotiations, which will most probably in turn deter-
mine its efficiency. Whatever the results of these negotiations, some prob-
lems will remain, however: the status of military cooperation, in particu-
lar, remains unclear” (Bagoyoko / Gibert 2007, 31).
In principle, complementarity should be possible. However, given the small
budget line for long-term measures under Art. 4(3), pre- and post-crisis pre-
paredness would need to be significantly bolstered in financial terms in or-
der to embrace the goals of the African Peace Facility.
4.4.3 Implementation
Article 5 depicts the general framework for implementation of the Instru-
ment for Stability, stipulating that Community assistance is provided
through exceptional assistance measures, interim response programmes,
multi-country strategy papers, thematic strategy papers, multi-annual in-
dicative programmes, annual action programmes and special measures.
Due to their non-programmable nature, the short-term component of the IfS
is being carried out through exceptional assistance measures and interim re-
sponse programmes. Article 6 (2) stipulates a number of conditions appli-
cable in the case of exceptional assistance measures as well as interim re-
sponse programmes.
First, projects are limited to 18 months (extendable for another six months
in the case of unforeseen implementation obstacles under the condition that
the financial amount of the measure does not increase). Second, exception-
al assistance measures costing less than EUR 20 million do not trigger the
Council comitology procedures. The Commission, however, keeps the
Council regularly informed about its planning of Community assistance un-
der Art. 3 of the IfS, and informs the Council of the nature and objectives
of measures costing up to EUR 20 million. Furthermore, Article 6 (6) urges
the Commission to keep the European Parliament informed at an early
stage whenever it adopts an exceptional assistance measures.
With regards to the long-term component of the Instrument for Stability,
multi-country strategy papers and thematic strategy papers constitute the
general basis for implementation; in both cases, the Commission is asked
to ensure that the specific needs of the individual country along with the
general international context to which it is exposed is taken into account
(Art. 7 [2]). Strategy papers need to be consistent with strategic program-
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ming under other Community instruments and “where appropriate, be
based on a dialogue with the partner country, countries or region con-
cerned, including with civil society, so as to support national development
strategies and to ensure the participation and involvement of the partner
country, countries or region” (Art. 7 [4]).
Article 7 (2) proposes to accompany each multi-country strategy paper with
a multi-annual indicative programme, which summarises the priority areas
targeted for Community assistance, the objectives to be met as well as the
expected outcome and timeframe of support including the financial alloca-
tion. In order to determine the scope of each financial allocation, multi-an-
nual indicative programmes intend using transparent and performance-dri-
ven criteria “taking into account the particular difficulties faced by coun-
tries or regions in crisis and conflict” (Art. 7 [6]). Annual action pro-
grammes set out concrete measures to be agreed upon in the multi-country
strategy papers and thematic strategy papers. On an annual basis, these pro-
grammes are expected to:
“[…] specify the objectives pursued, the fields of intervention, the expect-
ed results, the management procedures and total amount of financing
planned. They shall contain a summary description of the operations to be
financed, an indication of the amounts allocated for each operation and
an indicative implementation timetable. Where relevant, they should in-
clude the results of any lessons learned from previous assistance. Objec-
tives shall be measurable“ (Art. 8 [2]).
Finally, the Commission may also enact, in the event of unforeseen events,
special measures not provided for in multi-country or thematic strategy pa-
pers. In cases where special measures incur costs higher than EUR 5 mil-
lion, the comitology procedure will apply, according to Article 22 (2) of the
regulation. Whenever the financing is below this threshold, the Commis-
sion is only expected to inform the Committee within one month of adopt-
ing the special measure.
4.4.4 Beneficiaries and types of funding
Partner countries and regions, joint bodies (involving partner regions and
the Community), international organisations, European agencies and bod-
ies of any Member State, partner country, partner region or any other coun-
try contributing to the objectives of this regulation are eligible for financial
aid under this regulation. Community finance may take the form of projects
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and programmes, sectoral or general budget support, general import-sup-
port programmes in exceptional cases, contributions to international funds,
etc. Measures may be co-financed by Member States, other donor coun-
tries, international and regional organisations, companies, firms, other pri-
vate organisations and businesses, other non-state actors, partner countries
and regions in receipt of funding, and other bodies eligible for funding.
4.5 The Peace-building Partnership (PBP)
Under the crisis-preparedness component (see Article 4 [3]) of the Instru-
ment for Stability a so-called Peace-building Partnership has been estab-
lished. The IfS regulation itself is neither explicit about the concept of
‘peace-building’ nor does it mention the term ‘peace-building partnership’
in any conspicuous manner. The PBP aims at
“building and strengthening the capacity of international, regional and
sub-regional organisations, state and non-state actors in relation to their
efforts in:
(a) promoting early-warning, confidence-building, mediation and recon-
ciliation, and addressing emerging inter-community tensions;
(b) improving post-conflict and post-disaster recovery” (Art. 4 [3]).
Supported within the framework of the Peace-building Partnership are the
exchange of information, the transfer of know-how, the assessment of risks
and threats, research and analysis, early-warning systems and training. The
partnership itself was launched at a conference ‘From Early Warning to
Early Action’ in November 2007 in Brussels. The PBP aims to foster a net-
work specialised NGOs with expertise in early warning, peace-building and
recovery after a conflict or natural disaster. At the same time it seeks to de-
velop the relationship with other partners (UNDP and AU) and relevant
agencies in the Member States (e. g. European Group on Training).
The 2007-2011 Strategy Paper for the Instrument for Stability envisages
100 million euro for crisis-preparedness component from 2007–2013 (see
European Commission 2006, 21). The 2007–2008 Indicative Programme
disbursed EUR 15 million for “capacity-building for crisis response”; the
draft 2009–2011 Indicative Programme envisaged EUR 30-39 million for
building capacity for effective crisis response.
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After the 2008 call for proposals from civil society for capacity-building
(published in mid-March 2008) and for organisation of round-tables (pub-
lished in mid-May 2008), the Peace-building Partnership is currently in the
midst of a ‘pause for reflection’ in order to carry out a stocking-taking and
to draw up lessons learned which may inform the future direction of the ac-
tion (Interview 7). With a view to liaise with NGOs, the Commission offers
to hold regular consultation meetings with civil society organisations in the
context of the Peace-building Partnership – three such meetings were held
in 2008. In addition to representatives from civil society, relevant represen-
tatives from Member States and from the European Parliament are invited
to these meetings. Furthermore, the European Commission has also set-up
a PBP website where organisations can join in order to receive information
about future call for proposals.
The draft 2009 Annual Action Programme confirms the Commission’s
commitment to continue working with civil society organisations on peace-
building issues and to provide adequate funding to this purpose. With re-
gards to other target organisations, the Action Plan focuses on the UN
Peace-building Support Office’s Mediation Support Unit, the African
Union, the League of Arab States (enhancement of early warning net-
works), the International Dialogue on Peace-building and State Building,
managed by the OECD-DAC Secretariat and further delivery of training for
police experts in civilian missions.
The PBP clearly does not match the expectations of many NGOs which had
been pursuing more ambitious goals in the area of peace-building, includ-
ing a “genuine European Peace-Building Agency – [as] a counterpart to
the European Defence Agency” (European Commission 2008c, 214). Yet,
as explained by a representative from EPLO, the partnership takes “some
small steps in the right direction” (Interview 3).
4.6 First practice and experience with the Instrument
for Stability
The launch of the Instrument for Stability in 2007 strengthened the Com-
mission’s crisis response capacity, because the short-term component of the
IfS – the crisis response focus – contains the largest financial part of the In-
strument for Stability. During the period 2007 to 2013, the overall budget
for the IfS is EUR 2 062 billion. From this amount, Article 24 of the regu-
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lation specifies not more than 7 %, 15 % and 5 % respectively are allocat-
ed to each of the measures listed under the long-term component of the in-
strument (Art. 4 [1 –3]), i. e. threats to law and order, risk mitigation and
preparedness vis-à-visABC material and pre- and post-crisis preparedness.
These thresholds take into account the intention of the Council and the Eu-
ropean Parliament that the Instrument for Stability should primarily be de-
signed as an instrument for crisis response, and that IfS-funded long-term
measures should not be a substitute for those that could be more effective-
ly delivered under country or regional strategies, which are in turn funded
by the main geographic financing instruments (see European Commission
2006, 20). Consequently, at least 73 % or EUR 1 505 billion may be used
for crisis response measures. When compared to the RRM, the crisis re-
sponse capacity has increased considerably in terms of both financial allo-
cation and potential duration of measures. This can occur up to 24 months,
i. e. 18 months with the possibility of extension under certain conditions,
see Box 9.
Box 9: The Instrument for Stability in 2007
In its annual report the Commission provides a detailed overview of adopted Ar-
ticle 3 measures of the IfS outlining the main geographic coverage as follows:
In 2007, Sub-Saharan Africa received 43 % of the available funds, followed by
the Middle East with 22 %, the Western Balkans with 11 % (primarily in support
of the International Civilian Office in Kosovo, Latin America and the Caribbean
with 10 % and the Asia-Pacific region with 6 %. In terms of thematic initiatives,
the Commission distinguished ‘short-term advice to develop and kick-start post-
conflict security system reform’ (in DRC, Guinea Bissau, Lebanon), comple-
mentary measures in areas where ESDP missions are deployed (e.g. Democrat-
ic Republic of the Congo, Afghanistan, Chad), ‘support to regional peace-build-
ing capacity’ (AMISON Somalia, AU-UN Mediation effort in Darfur), ‘rule of
law and transitional justice’ (Afghanistan, Columbia, Haiti), with support to in-
terim administrations (ICO Kosovo), ‘conflict resolution and reconciliation’
(Uganda, Zimbabwe, Burma/Myanmar, Southern Thailand), ‘post-conflict needs
assessments and rehabilitation’ (Lebanese refugee camps), ‘support to displaced
populations’ (Lebanon, Syria), and ‘conflict resources’ (Kimberley Process) (see
European Commission 2008d). As for Article 4 activities the Commission, un-
der Article 4.1 or ‘trans-regional threats’, supported an Expert Support Facility,
an initiative on the fight against trafficking from and to Afghanistan and a bor-
der management project in the Philippines. With regards to Article 4.2 or ‘risk
mitigation CBRN’ measures, the Commission financially assisted the Support to
With an increased involvement of the EC Delegations in third countries, Di-
rectorate A of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for External
Relations (DG RELEX) is responsible for managing the crisis response
component (Art. 3) as well as ‘pre- and post-crisis preparedness building
measures’ under Article 4 (3) of the IfS. While DG RELEX stays involved
with measures addressing longer-term trans-regional security threats in
terms of programming, this component is managed under the direct re-
sponsibility of the EuropeAid Cooperation Office.
By its very nature, the crisis response component of the IfS cannot be pro-
grammed in advance, instead developing in response to crisis situations or
emerging crises. In contrast to EC humanitarian interventions, which are
deployable within days or weeks, the lead-time for launching IfS pro-
grammes – from initial assessment to providing finances for action on the
ground – is in the order of two to three months. For the IfS to kick in, it is
important to note that its purpose is neither to finance humanitarian aid nor
replace other EC financial instruments. IfS crisis response measures have
been designed alongside CFSP and ESDP measures and are typically mo-
bilised “in the case of a major new political crisis or natural disaster, or a
window of opportunity to pre-empt a crisis or an opportunity to advance
conflict resolution, or the need to secure the conditions for the delivery of
EC assistance” (European Commission 2008d, 5).
The European Commission suggests that there is no automatism as to
where and when the IfS may be mobilised, noting that there are situations
of long-standing crises “whose protracted status by nature would not justi-
fy funding new initiatives” (European Commission 2008d, 5). Although DG
Relex is in a position to propose new crisis response measures, the Euro-
pean Commission affirms that IfS programmes are often crafted involving
Stefan Gänzle
76 German Development Institute
the International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC) in Moscow and the Sci-
ence and Technology Centre in Ukraine, Kiev (STCU), a Knowledge Manage-
ment System on CBRN Trafficking and export control of dual-use goods. Arti-
cle 4.3 or ‘crisis preparedness’ measures are principally organised in a new
Peace-building Partnership whose main aim is to mobilise and consolidate civil-
ian expertise (including civil society organisations, international organisations
and Member State agencies) for peace-building activities (see European Com-
mission 2008d).
discussions with a wide range from actors from the European institutions,
the Member States and civil society. Indeed, if we look at the policy cycle
of the IfS, a number of entry points exist for these actors to exercise an in-
fluence.
4.7 Managing the security-development nexus:
The legal dimension
The Instrument for Stability’s main contribution towards managing the se-
curity-development nexus, so far, has been by providing a clearer picture in
legal terms. Thus, the IfS regulation has been instrumental in drawing a line
between CFSP and cooperation policies with regards to conflict prevention,
democracy promotion, SSR, antipersonnel landmines, fight against terror-
ism as well as the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nu-
clear materials or agents.
4.7.1 Conflict prevention and conflict management
Article 3 [2]a makes clear that issues relating to conflict prevention and
management are not entirely out of the scope of Community competence.
It was, for instance, already under the RRM that the Community provided
direct budgetary support to the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UN-
MIK), a practice that has also been continued under the auspices of the In-
strument for Stability. There are, however, some constraints imposed as to
what kind of conflict prevention and management measures are applicable:
Compared with the Commission’s draft proposal for the regulation of 2004
which declared among its objectives, the “military monitoring and peace-
keeping or peace-support operations (including those with a civilian com-
ponent) conducted by regional and sub-regional organisations and other
coalitions of states operating with United Nations endorsement […]” (Eu-
ropean Commission 2004, 15), no such reference has prevailed. This im-
plies that the Community shall not be mobilised in military conflict pre-
vention (neither by financial nor technical support). Still, the Community
and its Member States are entitled to provide funding to the African Peace
Facility via the EDF based on Art. 11 of the Cotonou Agreement. At the
same time, the Community, however, maintains a role in supporting meas-
ures that have an indirect effect on social and economic development in
third countries as stated in the ‘European Consensus on Development’ – a
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document which is mentioned explicitly in the IfS regulation. This is pro-
vided that these measures are of a rather civilian nature in their support of
international and regional organisations.
4.7.2 Security sector reform, democracy, rule of law and
human rights
According to Article 177 (2) and 181a, Community policy should contribute
to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the
rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental free-
doms. In principle, this had been acknowledged by EC financial instru-
ments. However, due to the fact that Article 11 of the Treaty of the EU sub-
scribes to the same objectives in terms of CFSP, various questions vis-à-vis
the legal dimension of the security-development nexus have arisen from
time to time. The Stability Instrument now offers something of a yardstick
for deciding whether measures should be launched under pillar I or pillar II
(see Hoffmeister 2008, 74 f.). If measures focussing on democracy, rule of
law and human rights are primarily geared towards the provision of training
as well as technical and financial assistance, they lie within Community
competence; in cases where measures imply the large-scale secondment of
lawyers, judges and policy officers from the Member States fulfilling a more
active role in managing the transition to rule of law, it would rather fall in-
to the competence of the Member States and therefore CFSP (see Box 10).
Box 10: Drawing the line between security and development in practice
From July 2004 to July 2005, the European Union launched its first ESDP Rule
of Law mission (EUJUST THEMIS), deployed in Georgia (Council Joint Action
2004/523/CFSP of 28 June 2004). In the framework of EUJUST THEMIS, sen-
ior personnel supported, mentored and advised Ministers, senior officials and
appropriate bodies at the level of the central government. EUJUST THEMIS
was designed to support the Georgian authorities in addressing urgent challenges
to the criminal justice system; so assisting the Georgian government in the de-
velopment of a coordinated overall approach to the reform process would have
been an appropriate use of Community rather than ESDP instruments. That is
why, as Hoffmeister assumes, the mission has subsequently been transformed in-
to a TACIS project without any major structural changes to its content and ob-
jectives (see Hoffmeister 2008, 67 f.). The second ESDP Rule of Law mission
to Iraq, in turn, deployed more than 1200 trained staff from the judicial sector to
As for SSR, yet another grey zone in terms of development and security
policy, Art. 3 (f) and (g) of the IfS regulation explicitly allow the Commu-
nity to engage in the provision of civilian measures for demobilisation,
along with the reintegration of former combatants into civil society and
mitigation of the social effects thereof. These provisions have certainly
helped in clarifying the legal situation.
4.7.3 Antipersonnel landmines and small arms
Mine detection and clearance as well as small arms control have been oth-
er contested issues. While Article 3 (h) clearly states the Community’s com-
petence in dealing with “the socio-economic impact on the civilian popula-
tion of antipersonnel landmines, unexploded ordnance or explosive rem-
nants of war” and “cover risk education, victim assistance, mine detection
and clearance and, in conjunction therewith, stockpile destruction”, sup-
port for measures to combat the proliferation of arms was not included (Art.
3 [h]). The exclusion of anti-small arms measures was due to a relevant
pending Court case in the ECOWAS region. Thus, as the Council assumed
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support the transition to rule of law. In terms of its objectives, but also due to its
sheer size and more politically sensitive context, the Iraqi mission had to be mo-
bilised under pillar II.
Following an official request by the DRC government, the EU decided to launch
an EU advisory and assistance mission for security reform in the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo (DRC) in June 2005 (EUSEC RD CONGO mission). The
mission provided advice and assistance to the Congolese authorities in charge of
security, while ensuring the promotion of policies that are compatible with hu-
man rights and international humanitarian law, and thus pertaining to gender is-
sues, to children affected by armed conflicts, to democratic standards, to princi-
ples of good public management, to transparency and to the observance of the
rule of law. As both the Council and the Commission were unable to find a com-
promise for a joint mission in 2006, the Commission focussed instead on the ju-
dicial sector whereas the Council focussed on military and police aspects. A sim-
ilar approach fostering complementarity between ESDP and other Community
activities was chosen for the mission that supported the Security Sector Reform
(SSR) in Guinea-Bissau in partnership with the Guinea-Bissau authorities. The
EU SSR Guinea-Bissau mission provides advice and assistance on reform of the
security sector in Guinea Bissau in order to contribute to creating conditions for
the implementation of the National Security Sector Reform Strategy.
Stefan Gänzle
80 German Development Institute
a pillar I competence in that regard, it was eager to maintain the differenti-
ation at that time. However, given the courts ruling in favour of the Com-
mission’s stance, it is likely to see small arms being included as a Commu-
nity competence relatively soon.
4.7.4 Fight against terrorism
Article 4 (1) a speaks to an area which, in principle, is governed by the third
pillar and upholds that the Community should contribute towards “strength-
ening the capacity of law enforcement and judicial and civil authorities in-
volved in the fight against terrorism and organised crime.” Therefore, the
IfS acquires a role – albeit a limited one – in this particular area. The IfS
regulation, in turn, refers to the 25 March 2004 European Council Declara-
tion on Combating Terrorism, which called for counter-terrorist objectives
to be integrated into external assistance programmes. The European Court
of Justice, however, has so far prevented the Commission from taking up a
key role in the fight against terrorism (see Box 11) while at the same time
acknowledging the Council’s recommendation for further streamlining ex-
ternal action.
Box 11: Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 23 October 2007 –
European Parliament v Commission of the
European Communities
In the present case the European Parliament sought annulment of the Commis-
sion’s decision approving a project relating to the security of the borders of the
Philippines to be financed by the European Communities. The decision, based
on considerations connected with the fight against terrorism and international
crime, was adopted to implement Council Regulation (European Economic
Community) No. 443/92 of 25 February 1992 on financial and technical assis-
tance to, and economic cooperation with, the developing countries in Asia and
Latin America. The Parliament argued that by adopting the contested decision,
the European Commission had exceeded the implementing powers conferred up-
on it by the regulation in question, as the Regulation No. 443/92 does not pro-
vide a legal basis for such a decision.
The court noted that there was no express reference for the fight against terror-
ism in Regulation No. 443/92 and hence there could not be any implementing
competence in this regard. Thus the court annulled the Commission’s decision
(see Engström 2008, 139 ff.).
Yet, as said, towards the backdrop of the IfS the EC competences with re-
gards to fighting terrorism are defined in clear terms. More importantly, in
both the ECJ’s and the IfS’ language, terrorism is put on an equal footing
with international organised crime, thus explicitly differentiating the ‘Eu-
ropean’ concept of terrorism from the one forged during the tenure of the
George W. Bush administration.
4.7.5 Proliferation of chemical, biological and
nuclear material
Article 4 (2) of the IfS regulation identifies risk mitigation and prepared-
ness relating to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials or
agents as an area of Community competence. There again the IfS walks a
thin line between the pillars. In contrast to the Commission’s draft propos-
al, there is no further reference to weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Since the launch of the European Security Strategy and the WMD Strategy,
initiatives focussing on the proliferation of WMD have to originate with the
CFSP. At the same time, important financial allocations are necessary to
provide funding for alternatives to military research with nuclear materials.
As a consequence, the IfS provisions allow the Community budget to pro-
vide for the financing of civilian nuclear research.
4.8 Managing the security-development nexus:
Coherence, flexibility and inclusiveness
The making of the Instrument for Stability is a step forward that may
strengthen the EU’s capacity in civilian crisis intervention in the long-term.
It constitutes an addition to EC instruments in response to crisis situations,
the others being humanitarian assistance, civil protection or other external
financial instruments provided that it can be urgently deployed in response
to a crisis situation. These Community instruments, together with EU Joint
Actions under CFSP/ESDP, constitute the very core of the EU’s crisis re-
sponse capability focussing on coherence, flexibility and inclusiveness.
4.8.1 Coherence
The IfS continues a host of efforts at the European level to improve inter-
institutional coordination and coherence of measures in external relations in
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general, and addresses the security-development nexus in particular. With-
out going into a discussion of coherence in the general EU context, it is suf-
fice to say that the IfS provides entry points for drawing development and
foreign security policy closer together.
First, the Commission keeps the Political and Security Committee as well
as the European Parliament informed about its planning for crisis response
programmes. In principle, Member States represented in the PSC have the
opportunity to comment on the Commission proposals. From the German
side, however, it seems that neither the Federal Foreign Office (AA) nor the
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ),
which receives its draft from the AA, have made use of these opportunities.
This is probably because of the short notice with which documents are be-
ing circulated, or because the IfS itself normally does not present a major
topic on the agenda and there have so far been neither “major discussions
on the Commission’s proposals for activities” (Interview 6) nor “major
problems with the Member States” (Interview 7). In terms of the general di-
rection of the Instrument, it was only once that Italy raised concerns as to
the allegedly overly developmental character of the IfS, thus implicitly re-
calling that the Instrument is being perceived as an important supplemen-
tary funding instrument for CFSP/ESDP actions. So far, in the case of the
short-term component, no comitology procedure has been invoked, because
the Commission always presented measures below the EUR 20 million
threshold, which would constitute the minimum threshold for establishing
a committee with Member States representatives.
Second, the regulation of the Instrument for Stability makes clear that EC
cooperation policies also refer to areas, which are not explicitly mentioned
in Article 177 and 181a TEC, which are the legal point of reference for the
IfS. In addition to fostering socio-economic development as well as democ-
racy, human rights and rule of law, the Community is entitled to support
these objectives indirectly as well (see Hoffmeister 2008, 74). Thus civilian
components of conflict prevention and management are part of the Com-
munity’s competence including aspects of non-proliferation of WMD, for
instance. Furthermore, the ECOWAS case has confirmed Community com-
petence in the area of stockpiling and destroying small weapons and arms.
Community measures enshrine technical and financial assistance to support
programmes, consultants and material as well as education and training.
Consequently, the Community may wield significant power in terms of
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defining the institutional set-up, for example in the security sector reform,
of a third country. At the same time, the Community is not permitted to get
involved in military aspects of peace-keeping and in fighting the prolifera-
tion of WMD.
Last but by all means not least, the IfS contains at the level of secondary
EC law, a provision to foster coherence in the EU’s external relations for
the very first time. Consequently, the IfS regulation entails a secondary law
provision-solidifying Article 3 (2) of the EU Treaty’s political commitment
to coherence. Whether or not this will allow the ECJ to rule on breaches of
this provision remains to be seen.
As for the practice of the Instrument for Stability, the assessment of the Eu-
ropean Parliament Budget Committee is certainly correct:
“The hard truth is that today’s challenges are not structured along any in-
stitutional delimitation of competences. Moreover, experience shows that
more support needs to be given to activities that fall precisely in the grey
area between traditional foreign and development policies.
That is why the Instrument for Stability should allow the EU to respond to
crises by building bridges between Community action and CFSP opera-
tions. In any event, the accent should therefore be placed on the best ways
for the Commission and Council to facilitate cross-pillar coordination and
combine and strengthen their roles” (European Parliament 2006, 78 f.).
Although the regulation makes some far-reaching concessions vis-à-vis
CFSP, both the Commission and the Council have become very sensitive in
choosing the appropriate legal basis for action. Thus the IfS may not nec-
essarily build a bridge between Community action and CFSP operations, al-
though it certainly has the potential to do so; yet for the reasons mentioned
above, it will certainly help to circumscribe the basis of each of the bridge’s
pillars, increasing legal security vis-à-vis the measures to be sponsored by
the IfS. Making the security-development work ultimately remains a polit-
ical task of all actors involved, the Commission, the Council, the European
Parliament as well as the Member States.
4.8.2 Flexibility and rapidity
The Instrument for Stability has clearly increased the speed with which the
Community can now respond to natural disasters and emerging political
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crises. Besides humanitarian aid, which is considered more apolitical in its
character, the Community can act within 8 to 12 weeks, and continue to act
for up to 18 months. As demonstrated, the IfS provides an important link
for long-term (geographical) programmes to kick in again. For example, the
IfS has been used to respond to and mitigate the effects of the 5-day war be-
tween Georgia and Russia in August 2008. Currently, the Commission has
asked a consultancy to provide an assessment of the IfS impact in third
countries (Interview 2). So far, as the European Commission states, no eval-
uations have been realised, so it is impossible to estimate the Instruments
added-value and effectiveness in terms of providing sustainable links with
other EC external instruments (CFSP/ESDP) as well as activities of other
international and regional organisations. For instance, it is not yet clear how
exactly IfS activities are integrated into long-term programmes funded by
the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI).
4.8.3 Inclusiveness
With regards to inclusiveness vis-à-vis other actors, a simple distinction
would be to look at internal and external partners assuming a role in deci-
sion- and/or policy-making in the context of the Instrument for Stability.
Although the European Commission is in a strong position as regards to the
short-term component, the number of actors involved has increased sub-
stantially. While the Commission’s draft proposal of 2004 favoured Article
308 as the legal platform for the regulation, the approved text eventually
was built on Article 177 and 181a requiring co-decision procedure, which
puts the European Parliament on an equal footing with the Council. Obvi-
ously, the European Parliament celebrated this decision as a major success
in increasing its oversight in EC external relations, and thus providing ad-
ditional democratic legitimacy. This is remarkable, as the scope of the Eu-
ropean Parliament’s involvement in matters of CFSP remains remarkably
low. Beside the right to ask questions on CFSP/ESDP matters, the only way
for the Parliament to exercise influence is through its indirect role in de-
ciding about the EU’s budget, based on the co-decision procedure.
Inter-institutional arrangements as well as other informal agreements are of
some importance here as they may grant (informal) rights, such as the pos-
sibility of MEPs meeting with the Political and Security Committee five
times per year in order to discuss the ESDP agenda (Interview 5). As the
Commission keeps the Parliament informed about its measures, in particu-
Stefan Gänzle
84 German Development Institute
lar with regards to the short term component of the instrument, in principle
Parliament is in a position to exercise some forms of ‘pre-scrutiny’. But,
again, it is very difficult to measure its direct impact on decision-making
within the Commission (and possibly, the Council). Therefore, while Par-
liament has had quite some influence in terms of shaping the Instrument
during the inter-institutional process, its follow-up options and oversight
vis-à-vis implementation are relatively small.
Still, somewhat at the boundary between internal and external inclusive-
ness, the involvement of NGOs has been strengthened. Referring to Article
4 (3) of the regulation, it is in the interest of the Commission to build civil-
ian capacity for crisis response, “also via continued support to organisa-
tions conducting policy-oriented and field-based research on early warning
and conflict prevention and continued facilitation of the identification and
sharing of operational best practice” (European Commission 2008a). The
2009 Annual Action Programme will pursue a three-pronged approach:
First, the Peace-building Partnership that strengthens the capacity of non-
state actors active in the field of peace-building; second, further develop-
ment of cooperation with international and regional organisations, in par-
ticular with regard to early warning aspects; and third, continuing to build-
up the EU’s capability to contribute to international civilian stabilisation
missions through operational training of EU police experts. According to a
Commission official, approximately one hundred NGOs (Interview 2) –
among them some of Europe’s biggest like International Alert and the EP-
LO – have responded to a call for proposals.
Some smaller NGOs have expressed concerns with regards to this ap-
proach, fearing that it will prioritise well-connected and larger Brussels-
based NGOs. At the same time, this budget line within the Instrument for
Stability allows for funding of sub-regional and international organisations,
in particular the African Union and sub-regional communities as well as
UNDP, World Bank and the UNPBC. However with regards to the latter,
one Commission official affirmed that the EU has no intention of con-
tributing directly to the UNPBC peace fund (Interview 2). It appears that
the Commission rather prefers a project-based approach and so declares
that it may be avoiding duplication. In a nutshell, although the PBP seems
to be an innovative element of the Instrument for Stability, funding re-
sources are fairly constrained.
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5 Conclusions and policy recommendations
With a total budget of EUR 2 062 million for the period 2007-13, out of
which approximately 73 % are non-programmable funds to respond to cri-
sis and conflict situations, the Instrument for Stability definitely is highly
flexible. It came as twist of fate that EUR 240 million will be redeployed
from the IfS and channelled towards the EU’s newly created Flexibility In-
strument (FI) or Food Facility18 as the European Union had committed
funds equalling EUR 1 billion to counter the effects of the world food cri-
sis. Although the IfS budget of 2009 has been reduced by EUR 70 million
to EUR 134.769 million, it would be wrong to entirely dismiss the Instru-
ment for Stability.
Still, the Instrument for Stability constitutes the European Community’s
main policy tool for providing financial assistance to countries in situations
of (emerging) crisis that seeks to support stability by providing an effective
response, to help preserve, establish or re-establish the conditions essential
to the proper implementation of the community’s development and cooper-
ation policies. This new instrument has been forged against the background
of on-going international debates on the complex relationship between de-
velopment and security – a debate that has increasingly been framed in
terms of a ‘nexus’, which means that both are intrinsically linked and mu-
tually reinforcing. That there is ‘no development without security’ has in
the meantime become common currency in both security and development
communities alike, despite still existing ‘cultural differences’ exacerbated
by a general reluctance to engage with each other. These debates have in-
formed various international actors and governments, as much as their pol-
icy discourses and policy-making practices – in particular the European
Union. As for the European Union, development and defence ministers met
at their first joint Council meeting in November 2007 acknowledging that
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18 “EUR 240 million in commitment appropriations will be redeployed within heading 4
from the Instrument for Stability […] of which EUR 70 million in 2009. Regarding the
redeployments for 2010, the Commission is invited to present a revised financial pro-
gramming in order to ensure an orderly progression of the amounts planned over the pe-
riod 2010-2013, while keeping the annual level of the margin unchanged” (Council of
the European Union 2008, 6).
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the nexus between development and security should inform EU strategies
and policies with a view to increasing coherence of EU external action.
The Instrument for Stability significantly reduces the EU’s ‘reaction time’
for responding to crisis situations to approximately eight weeks and it is in
a position to provide funding for measures lasting up to 18 months. Al-
though every crisis situation is unique, the IfS provides the capacity for an
early and an sustained response. Thus the IfS addresses the time dimension
of the security-development nexus by effectively bridging short-term and
long-term EU/EC assistance. In addition, if compared to its predecessor, the
RRM, the IfS lends the Community additional, yet modest financial mus-
cles in (pre-) crisis management by providing resources for operating with-
in the grey area between traditional foreign and development policies
Furthermore, the Instrument for Stability addresses the politico-legal di-
mension of the security-development nexus within the European Union,
which is complicated by the fact that it stretches over several layers of poli-
cies and competence. First, it seeks to increase the potential for coherence
within EC external relations (pillar I) itself; second, it also proposes to
‘lower the bar’ between the EU’s individual pillars of its complex gover-
nance structure with a view to enabling collaboration between EC external
relations, development policy and the Common Foreign and Security Poli-
cy (CFSP). Third, as development policy is a shared competence between
the European Union and its Member States, it also aims to improve coop-
eration between the European and national level.
From the perspective of EU law and for the first time in the realm of sec-
ondary law, the regulation covering the Instrument for Stability enshrines
the obligation for EU institutions to ensure coherence in the external poli-
cies of both the European Union and the Community. Anticipating the im-
plementation of the Reform Treaty, the IfS has sought to provide an oppor-
tunity for Commission and Council to gather experience in closer coopera-
tion in the grey zone area between foreign and development policies. To-
gether with several recent ECJ rulings, the IfS has ultimately clarified the
legal basis for initiating Community or EU action. While some of the ES-
DP or EC-sponsored missions of the past had suffered quite some legal con-
fusion, the IfS regulation has helped to clarify various aspects of the ‘grey
zone’ existing between security and development at the threshold of EC co-
operation policies and CFSP. Given the increase of civilian ESDP missions
over the past five years, this ultimately is a precondition for enhanced co-
herence between EU institutions.
The making of the Instrument for Stability is a step forward that consider-
ably strengthens the EU’s capacity in civilian crisis intervention. It consti-
tutes an important addition to EC instruments in response to crisis situa-
tions, the others being humanitarian assistance and civil protection, when
urgently re-deployed in response to a crisis situation. These Community in-
struments, together with EU Joint Actions under CFSP/ESDP, constitute the
essence of the EU’s crisis response capability. The Instrument has the po-
tential to improve coherence for the European Union’s external action as it
determines the areas where Community prevails; while legally remaining
an EC instrument decided upon by the Commission, the close coordination
with EU Member States, notably in the Political and Security Committee
but also in the geographic working groups, has made it a politically re-
sponsive EC instrument.
Finally, the IfS has strengthened the European Parliament’s role in matters
of EU foreign policy (see Box 12). In addition to this internal inclusiveness,
aspects of the IfS, such as for instance the Peace-building Partnership, pro-
vide NGOs with the opportunity to have a stake in the policy-shaping
process. It may well be that the PBP presents a small step towards a more
full-fledged European Agency dealing with Peace-building – thus adding
substance to the EU’s (self-) image of a civilian power.
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Box 12: A final assessment by the EP Rapporteur on the Instrument
for Stability
“This is the first time we truly have parliamentary control over future foreign
policy planning. That is one of the main achievements of the Instrument for Sta-
bility. The other one is the creation of the Peacebuilding Partnership. It provides
for the development of a representative network of NGOs engaged in conflict
prevention, early warning, peace building and post-conflict operations and it al-
so allows for direct financial support for regional organisations and networks to
increase their respective capabilities. For future planning this could be seen as
a real nucleus of a European Civil Peace Corps. Without the EP in the negotia-
tions this Peacebuilding Partnership would not have been created.
5.1 Policy recommendations to European policy-makers
The Instrument for Stability has the potential to improve coherence for the
European Union’s external action. While legally remaining an EC instru-
ment decided upon by the Commission, the close coordination with EU
Member States, notably in the Political and Security Committee but also in
the geographic working groups, has made the IfS a politically responsive
EC instrument. Given the early stage of lessons-drawing from the Instru-
ment for Stability, and due to the fact that the mid-term review will occur
at some point in spring 2009 (instead of 2010), this study concludes on
some tentative recommendations.
1. Within the European institutions, coordination of units dealing with the
security-development nexus (and the IfS for that matter) should be im-
proved. After the entry into force of the EU External Action Service,
the IfS could be used as an entry point for effective Commission and
Council collaboration at the level of EU delegations.
2. The Instrument for Stability should be used in close coordination with
CFSP measures, but it should not be framed as a complementary to the
CFSP budget only. The European Parliament has already expressed its
non-satisfaction with regards to maintaining the funding of the Kiev
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19 I am grateful to Birte Gäth, assistant to Angelika Beer MEP, for making arrangements for
this communication.
After the first two years we can summarise that the cooperation with the Com-
mission is going well. They keep us informed. However, their way of decision
making is not always transparent to us. One of our repeated questions related to
criteria for their involvement in one crisis and not the other. As two years are
hardly sufficient time to implement a new instrument thoroughly we are waiting
for long-term achievements and/or failures to understand better the conse-
quences of that instrument. Right now the only alarming tendency is to immedi-
ately support ESDP missions although Parliament might have another view on
the importance of one or the other ESDP mission. The Stability Instrument was
a tool to strengthen the EU as a civilian power not another budget line for mil-
itary adventures.”
(Author’s correspondence with Angelika Beer, 5 May 200919)
and Moscow centres for conversion (funded under the long-term com-
ponent of the IfS). Ensure that the Instrument for Stability is effective-
ly used as a bridge-builder between security and development policy.
In order to increase the EU’s capacities in crisis prevention, the IfS
needs to command sufficient financial resources.
3. Given the Commission’s paramount role in launching the instrument, it
should aim at providing Member States with adequate information
ahead of time. Member States representatives attending committee
meetings to screen Commission proposals for the IfS have complained
about lack of time. Member States themselves should use this opportu-
nity to increase, wherever appropriate, inter-ministerial coordination
and seek to align national efforts with the objectives of the IfS. Col-
laboration between colleagues of the German Foreign Ministry and
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)
has been described as good in this particular context.
4. Provided that there is a substantial increase of the budget, it would al-
so be possible to integrate the Peace Facility for Africa into the In-
strument for Stability. If the European Development Fund was to be put
into the regular EC budget (‘budgetisation’), this could possibly be
achieved more easily. By all means it would increase coherence by fur-
ther reducing the number of different financing instruments for linking
security and development policies.
5. It is a bad sign, if major funding is channelled away from the Instru-
ment for Stability towards different facilities, i.e. the Food Facility. It
is even worse if the objectives are not necessarily diametrically op-
posed to the ones of the IfS. From a human security perspective the
food crisis also is a concern for the Instrument for Stability. Conse-
quently, the IfS – and its Community-based mechanism could, in prin-
ciple, have been initialled to respond to it. What is more important,
however, is to ensure that the IfS can continue to be used as an instru-
ment that proactively forges links between security and development
policies.
6. Although there might be some scepticism about strengthening the role
of NGOs, given that it may work in the opposite direction of enhancing
coordination, NGOs need to be integrated into policy-shaping and pol-
icy-taking phases of the Instrument for Stability. European NGOs
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should be encouraged to strengthen links with other European and, in
particular, Southern partners in order to win bids within the Peace-
building Partnership. Furthermore, NGOs in the relevant fields should
liaise with European Commission Delegations. While it is understand-
able that NGOs might lobby for integrating peace-building into geo-
graphic instruments, it is advantageous to maintain a separate funding
stream for civil crisis management at a global scale.
5.2 Policy recommendations to German policy-makers
At the time of its inception, expectations vis-à-vis the Instrument for Sta-
bility were particularly high within the BMZ. Together with representatives
from the Federal Foreign Office the BMZ is taking part in committee (Ver-
waltungsausschuss) meetings that screen Commission proposals for the
IfS. The BMZ has provided comments on the Commission’s drafts for the
2007 and 2008 Annual Action Programmes, in particular vis-à-vis the
Peace-building Partnership component and the involvement of NGOs from
the South. The BMZ has refrained from commenting on draft proposals for
crisis response measures which are discussed within the PSC-format in-
volving representatives from the Member States’ Foreign Ministries. Still,
the German Foreign Ministry has been highly cooperative and regularly
forwarded drafts to the BMZ (Interview 7). It appears that there is some po-
tential within the BMZ to discuss proposals for the IfS in those Country or
Regional Council working groups which involve the BMZ.
1. Build on positive coordination between the Foreign Federal Office and
the BMZ. It appears that the officials from the Foreign Federal Office
are willing to cooperate with the BMZ on the IfS. Play a more active
role in shaping the IfS’ potential impact. Again, while the Instrument
has created more clarity in legal terms between cooperation policies
and CFSP, it is ultimately about having the political will to build
bridges between security and development. The need to provide these
links is likely to increase in the very near future, rather than decrease.
2. Support German and European NGOs in linking up with other Euro-
pean and Southern partners in order to win bids within the Peace-
building Partnership. Encourage NGOs in the relevant fields to active-
ly link up with the European Commission Delegation in IfS-targeted
countries.
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3. Maintain the separate funding instrument for civil crisis management.
While it is understandable that NGOs might lobby for integrating
peace-building into geographic instruments, it is advantageous to main-
tain a separate funding instrument for civil crisis management. This is
simply because the IfS is not just about financing, but about construct-
ing a security-development nexus within EU foreign policy.
These recommendations are rather preliminary ones, given the absence of
IfS impact evaluations. The mid-term report of the Instrument for Stability
is yet another occasion to acquire more information in order to fully grasp
the IfS capacities and effects. At the same time, this is just another stone in
the mosaic of improving the European Union’s capacity to act coherently
on the global stage. As one Commission official (Interview 2) argued, the
potential of the IfS is to be a “global rather than a regional and purely de-
velopmental tool.”
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creation of the post of High Representative for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy (by 2009) and European
External Action Service
28 Feb 2007 European Commission Communication ‘Code of con-
duct on complementarity and the division of labour in
development policy’
1 Jan 2007 The Instrument for Stability becomes operational
8 June 2006 European Commission Communication on ‘Europe in
the World – Some practical proposals for greater coher-
ence, effectiveness and visibility’
24 May 2006 European Commission Communication on ‘A Concept
for European Community support for security sector re-
form’
22 Nov 2005 “The European Consensus”: Joint Statement by the
Council and the representatives of the Governments of
the Member States meeting within the Council, the Eu-
ropean Parliament and the Commission on European
Union Development Policy
12 Oct 2005 European Commission Communication ‘EU Strategy
for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate
Africa’s development’
24 May 2005 With regards to the Commission Communication on
Policy Coherence for Development, the GAERC ac-
knowledges that security is among priorities for policy
coherence for development
12 April 2005 Policy Coherence for Development – Accelerating
progress towards attaining the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (Communication from the Commission to
the Council, the European Parliament and the European
Economic and Social Committee)
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29 Oct 2004 Constitutional Treaty signed in Rome
The Treaty integrates the EU’s external action into one
chapter emphasising the need for further policy coher-
ence. More clearly than before, the long-term goal of
poverty eradication is declared to be a primary objec-
tive of Union development cooperation policy.
“[…] The Union shall ensure consistency between the
different areas of its external action and between these
and its other policies” (art. III - 292).
[…] The Union shall take account of the objectives of
development cooperation in the policies that it imple-
ments which are likely to affect developing countries.
[…]” (art. III - 316).
17 Dec 2004 Brussels European Council endorses ‘The civilian
headline goal 2008’ which sets out the EU’s ambitions
for civilian ESDP
7 Nov 2002 European Commission Communication on ‘Participa-
tion of non-state actors in EC development policy’
21 - 22 June 2002 Creation of a new General Affairs and External Rela-
tions Council integrating “the whole of the Union’s ex-
ternal action, namely common foreign and security pol-
icy, European security and defence policy, foreign
trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid.”
(Seville European Council, Presidency Conclusions,
22)
11 April 2001 European Commission Communication on ‘Conflict
prevention’
6 March 1996 European Commission Communication ‘The European
Union and the issue of conflicts in Africa: Peace-build-
ing, conflict prevention and beyond’
1 Nov 1993 Treaty of Maastricht enters into force containing pro-
visions on coherence in external relations and devel-
opment cooperation (art. 3 TEU an art. 178 TEC)
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Interviews
Interview 1: Foreign Service Officer, Foreign Ministry of Finland, Bonn, 19
August 2008.
Interview 2: Staff of the Administration, European Commission, Unit for
Crisis Response and Peace Building in the Directorate-General for External
Relations, Brussels, 18 September 2008.
Interview 3: Member of the European Peace-building Liaison Office (EP-
LO), Brussels, 18 September 2008.
Interview 4: Staff of the Administration, European Parliament, Committee
on Foreign Affairs (AFET), Brussels, 18 September 2008.
Interview 5: Staff of the Administration, Directorate-General for External
Policies of the Union, Policy Department, European Parliament, Brussels,
14 October 2008.
Interview 6: Staff of the German Agency for Technical Cooperation
(GTZ), phone interview on 18 November 2008.
Interview 7: Staff of the Administration, European Commission, Unit for
Crisis Response and Peace Building in the Directorate-General for Exter-
nal Relations, 19 March 2009.
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